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Abstract
We study an analytically solvable version of Krugman’s Core-Periphery model extended
to three regions. This is the 3-region Footloose Entrepreneur model based on the 2-
region version by Forslid and Ottaviano (2003). Solvability is achieved by employment
of the skilled inter-regionally mobile work-force in the fixed costs and the unskilled
immobile work-force in the variable costs of the manufacturing firms. This enables us
to obtain real wages as explicit functions of the spatial distributions of skilled workers
in the three regions. The main aim of this work is to study long-run equilibria of
the model in terms of skilled workers’ migration, which is based on indirect utility
differentials as given by differences in inter-regional real wage differences. For this
purpose, we focus on the analysis of stability of three types of equilibria: concentration,
total and partial dispersion. The first corresponds to full agglomeration of industry in
one region, the second refers to an equalized spatial distribution of skilled workers
across the three regions and the third pertains to a situation whereby skilled workers
are equally dispersed in two of the three regions. We show analytical and numerical
evidence in that the latter configuration is always unstable. We also compare our results
concerning concentration and total dispersion with those of the 2-region model. Finally,
we discuss the existence and robustness of bifurcations in our 3-region model.
Keywords: new economic geography, core-periphery, footloose entrepreneur
JEL Classification Numbers: R10, R12, R23
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Resumo
Estudamos uma versão analiticamente resolúvel do modelo “core-periphery” de Krug-
man estendido para três regiões. Trata-se do modelo “Footloose Entrepreneur” com
três regiões baseado na versão com duas regiões por Forslid e Ottaviano (2003). A
solvabilidade do modelo é alcançada através da incorporação da força de trabalho qual-
ificada e inter-regionalmente móvel nos custos fixos e da força de trabalho imóvel e
não qualificada nos custos variáveis das empresas industriais. Isto permite-nos obter os
salários reais como funções explícitas da distribuição espacial dos trabalhadores qualifi-
cados nas três regiões. O objetivo principal deste trabalho é o de estudar os equilíbrios
de longo prazo em termos da migração de trabalhadores qualificados, que é baseada
em diferenciais de utilidade indireta dados pelas diferenças inter-regionais dos salários
reais. Para este fim, concentramo-nos na análise da estabilidade de três tipos de equi-
líbrio: concentração, dispersão total e parcial. O primeiro corresponde à aglomeração
total da indústria numa região, o segundo refere-se a uma distribuição espacial dos
trabalhadores qualificados equalizada pelas três regiões, e o terceiro refere-se a uma
situação em que os trabalhadores qualificados estão igualmente dispersos em duas das
três regiões. Apresentamos evidência analítica e numérica no sentido de que a última
configuração seja sempre instável. Comparamos também os nossos resultados, relativos
à concentração e à dispersão total, com as do modelo para duas regiões. Finalmente,
discutimos a existência e robustez de bifurcações no modelo com três regiões.
Palavras-chave: nova economia geográfica, centro-periferia, footloose entrepreneur
Código JEL: R10, R12, R23
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1 Introduction
The secular tendency for agglomeration of economic activity in specific industrial sectors
in many countries and regions is well known and has been a matter of profound debate
for a long time. However, up to recent years, the economic science had either neglected
or simply failed to explain the spatial distribution of the factors of production and eco-
nomic activity in general. If not due to a disregard for its evident importance and its
consequences on the unequal income distributions, increasing clustering of economic ac-
tivity and integration, then at least doubtlessly due to the difficulties it imposes on the
analytical treatment of increasing returns, as is suggested by Fujita et al. (1999). The
insistent clinging to constant returns as a simplifying assumption makes it unfeasible to
explain the cumulative process of the self-perpetuating geographic concentration of eco-
nomic activities. Howbeit, in the past few decades, there have been a lot of theoretical
advances in this field of Economic Geography, partially thanks to new techniques de-
veloped in economic modeling, numerical methods and computation, specially in other
fields such as industrial economics and economic growth. These allowed for a more
rigorous treatment, based on microeconomic foundations, of the phenomena associated
with the agglomeration of economic activities.
Economic Geography can be understood as the study of where the different economic
activities take place and the intrinsic reasons that justify it. Transport costs, increasing
returns and factor mobility are among such reasons. Of course, it would be unfair to
claim that such efforts in trying to explain industrial location have not been made in
the somewhat distant past, like the development of models that descend from the von
Thünen theory (von Thünen, 1826) on agricultural land use.
Johann von Thünen was arguably a pioneer in addressing the causes that led to spatial
location and how this would affect prices, before industrialization had occurred. In his
famous model, different types of agriculture were placed in four concentric rings around
a central city. Close proximity to the city meant low transport costs, so the farther the
rings were from the city, the more agricultural products not susceptible to high transport
1
costs were produced.1 Inversely, land cost was highest in the ring surrounding the city,
being a decreasing function of the distance to the city. The model, thus, established
an inverse relation between rent and distance from the center of the city centre and,
hence, spatial location.
Nevertheless, it was not until recent years that Economic Geography jumped into main-
stream economics, and it has been gaining more and more relevance ever since. Under
this premise, many New Economic Geography (NEG) models have been developed.
Among these, that which may be considered the benchmark of NEG models is the
Core-Periphery (CP) model with two regions by Krugman (1991b), a model based
on Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) monopolistic competition. In particular, this model explains
geographic concentration due to the increasing economic integration, discerning the
different forces that lead to or drive away from agglomeration outcomes. The spatial
distribution (and therefore concentration) of the economy depends on labour migration
which in turn responds to real wage differences across different regions.2
Three main effects drive the mechanics of the CP model. First, there is a “market size
effect”, whereby a new entrant firm in a market causes local expenditures to grow and
generates a positive impact on demand per firm, thus implying a preference for bigger
markets on behalf of the firms. The second effect is called “cost of living” effect and
stems from a decrease in price indices induced by the increase of competition due to
the entrance of a new firm which results in a positive impact on consumer surplus.
Specifically, this price reduction reflects the narrower array of goods that consumers
have to import from abroad and that are subject to transport costs. Finally, we have
the “market crowding effect”, by which the aforementioned decrease in price indexes
naturally has a negative impact on demand per firm. The first two encourage full
agglomeration outcomes, while the third clearly discourages geographic concentration.
It is widely acknowledged that the original NEG model suffers from the fact that it
1We can think of livestock, since animals are able to transport themselves, thus implying lower
transport costs. On the other hand, perishable goods that needed to be transported quickly would be
produced closer to the city.
2The original CP model by Krugman (1991b) exhibits no explicit dynamics. These are shown in
the monograph by Fujita et al. (1999).
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has no analytic solution. Nonetheless, extensive literature has been able to derive
interesting and relevant conclusions, whether analytical or resulting from numerical
simulations. The synopsis in Fujita et al. (1999) is widely acknowledged as a bulwark
in NEG, and NEG models have come to rely heavily on the modeling tricks and results
summarized by it. More recent works have focused on further enhancing the possibility
of deriving results from existing NEG models, like those from Robert-Nicoud (2005),
Mossay (2006), and the possibility to relate them with other subjects, as in Fujita and
Thisse (2003) where the authors combine Krugman’s CP model with an endogenous
growth model to study the effects of agglomeration on economic growth.
From the difficulty of dealing with Krugman’s CP model, the need arises of modifica-
tions that make it easier to manipulate analytically, enabling us to extract more from
the model than just a gallery of possible outcomes. For instance, in Ottaviano et al.
(2002), the assumptions on trade costs and utility functions of Krugman’s CP model are
changed to account for the possibility of deriving analytical results. While this renders
the solutions obtained by Krugman (1991b) analytically, some of the main features of
the original CP model have been dropped off. These include changes on assumptions
on preferences and transport costs.
That being said, there is still a need for modifications that do not change its funda-
mentals, while making it much more tractable. Following this line of thought, Forslid
and Ottaviano (2003) have proposed an analytically solvable version of the CP model
with two regions, with skill heterogeneity between agricultural and industrial workers
and restricted inter-regional mobility to the more skilled workers. They employ the
unskilled workers in the variable costs and the skilled workers in the fixed costs. This
cost structure of firms does not change the qualitative insight of Krugman’s original
model but rather simplifies the analysis, rendering it analytically solvable (see Forslid
and Ottaviano, 2003). They have dubbed their version of the CP model the Footloose
Entrepreneur (FE) model3. It provides the means to obtain closed form solutions and
express the relevant endogenous variables which are the cornerstones to explaining loca-
tion decisions by firms and workers as functions of the spatial distribution of the latter.
3Previous versions of the model had already been put forth independently by Ottaviano (1996) and
Forslid (1999).
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A version of this model has allowed Baldwin et al. (2003) to discuss policy analysis on
New Economic Geography.
Although rich in its conclusions, the CP model by Forslid and Ottaviano does not pro-
vide any theoretical insight on a three or more region model, which would be interesting
for different reasons. As pointed out by Fujita et al. (1999), a universe considering only
two regions stems from the attractiveness in dealing with manageable sized problems,
although it seems implausible that the geographical relevance on economic activity
worldwide can be reduced two a 2-region analysis. Extrapolation to a n-region case
might be, however, too big a jump from the simpler case with two regions, though
certainly not strange to many authors. A contribution concerning the former that is
worth mentioning is that of Puga (1999) in his article about the region inequalities
in income levels and industry location that stem from different levels of regional inte-
gration. He found that the relation between decreasing trade costs and agglomeration
might be non-monotonic if the underlying integration is not accompanied by an in-
crease in inter-regional mobility. The result is rather surprising, as even if a decrease
in initially high trade costs (which entails, accordingly, an initially dispersed indus-
try) favours agglomeration of industry, there seems to be a threshold below which, if
workers are not allowed to migrate in response to wage differentials, firms will become
increasingly sensitive to these differentials and will begin to disperse over time. Puga
uses a more general framework and relaxes some of the assumptions found in some
well known NEG models, such as those by Krugman (1991b), Krugman and Venables
(1995) and Venables (1996).4 However, in this context, what we want to highlight in the
work of Puga is his generalization of the study of the dynamic properties of symmetric
equilibria5 to a n-region scenario.
Other contributions include those in the Racetrack Economy by Fujita et al. (1999).
The authors consider a set of n regions that are equally spaced around the circumference
of a circle. Transport costs are the same between each pair of adjacent regions, as they
4The second and third works address the problem of international barriers to labour mobility which
may limit its role in explaining clustering of industries in an international context. However, as is
mentioned by Puga (1999), they rely on very restrictive assumptions.
5Equilibrium at which all regions have identical values for all endogenous variables.
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are equidistant from each other. Numerical results evidence a pattern of an equal con-
centration of industry in two of the n regions and, in particular, some sort of regularity
in that these regions are placed at exact opposite sides of the circle. Before dealing with
the n-region case in the Racetrack Economy, Fujita et al. (1999) also addressed the
particular 3-region case. However, as in the Racetrack Economy, results concerning the
existing equilibria and their dynamical properties are only numerical. On this matter,
Castro et al. (2009) provide a number of analytical conclusions and numerical analysis
regarding an extension to three regions of the CP model by Krugman (1991b) with two
regions along with an insight on the n-region case.
Departing from the 2-region case, it is therefore a natural next step to address the 3-
region case, but the inherent difficulties that might arise from it call for a more tractable
version of the CP model. The main aim of this dissertation is to use analysis and
techniques similar to the simpler CP model with two regions by Forslid and Ottaviano
(2003) in order to build and study a FE model with three regions. It becomes evident
that the inclusion of three regions is enough to show that the FE model still does not
allow us to fully describe its dynamic properties analytically.
We begin by generalizing the FE model to three regions in section 2 and deriving a
general expression for the nominal wages as explicit functions of the spatial distribu-
tion of skilled workers. In section 3, a detailed analysis on three possible outcomes
concerning the dynamics of the CP model is made. We establish the stability condi-
tions for geographic concentration and total dispersion equilibria and prove that the
3-region model favours geographic concentration of economic activity over the 2-region
model. We also determine that location decisions do not depend so much on whether
we consider two or three regions in the CP model when the percentage of local income
spent in industrial goods is too low or the elasticity of substitution is very high when
industry approaches that of perfect competition. We also establish conditions whereby
an outcome of partial dispersion is never stable and show what we hope to be enough
numerical evidence that it never is, whatever the parameter values. Albeit, nonlinearity
of some stability conditions concerning trade costs does not allow us to fully assess this
analytically. We finish section 3 by addressing the existence of bifurcations in the 3-
region FE model. Section 4 makes some considerations on possible extensions of the FE
model to n-regions, particularly related to agglomeration and total dispersion outcomes
and section 5 is left for some concluding remarks.
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2 The model
The economy is comprised of three regions that are assumed to be structurally symmet-
ric in all aspects and equidistant from each other. All the assumptions on the economics
of the model pertain to those of the 2-region model by Forslid and Ottaviano (2003)
and, hence, our derivations are analogous to the latter, the differences being exactly
those that result from the fact that we are considering three regions instead of two.
All notation follows that of Forslid and Ottaviano (2003), except that respective to the
real wages, as we shall see further ahead. Even though a good deal of our construction
is a replication of Forslid and Ottaviano’s, we include it here for completeness. We
explicitly and clearly state the differences.
2.1 Economic environment
We have skilled and unskilled labour as production factors, of whose type each worker
supplies exactly one unit inelastically, with endowments being H and L, respectively.
Considering the three regions, we have H = H1 + H2 + H3 and L = L1 + L2 + L3.
The skilled workers are assumed to be self employed entrepreneurs who can move freely
between the three regions, while unskilled labour is completely immobile and considered
to be evenly spread across the three regions. Hence, the endowment L is such that
Li = L3 , with i = {1, 2, 3}.
In this economy, there are two production sectors. Firstly, we have the sector of agri-
cultural goods, which produces a homogenous good under perfect competition and
constant returns, and employs unskilled labour L. Secondly, there is the industrial
sector, which is in charge of producing manufactures under Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic
competition (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977) and increasing returns, and employs the skilled
and mobile workforce H.
The representative consumer has the following Cobb-Douglas utility function:
Ui = Xµi A
1−µ
i , (2.1)
where Ai is the consumption of agricultural products and Xi is the consumption of the
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composite of all differentiated varieties of manufactures, defined by:
Xi =
[ˆ
sN
di(s)
σ
σ−1ds
] σ
σ−1
, (2.2)
where di(s) is consumption of variety s of manufactures in region i, N is the mass
of varieties so that ni is the mass of varieties produced in region i (implying that
N = n1 + n2 + n3) and σ > 1 is the constant elasticity of substitution between
manufactured varieties. From standard utility maximization, µ ∈ (0, 1) is the share
of manufactured goods in expenditure. Final consumers show no preferences among
the varieties, however, they would like to diversify and be able to consume different
varieties, thus increasing their utility. The local income Yi comprises skilled (wi) and
unskilled (wLi ) nominal wages, as follows:
Yi = wiHi + wLi Li. (2.3)
Returning to the industrial sector, product differentiation ensures that each variety is
produced by one firm. In order to produce x units of variety s, a firm incurs a fixed cost
equal to α units of skilled labour and a marginal cost equal to β units of unskilled labour
for each unit of output produced. Herein lies the main difference between Krugman’s
CP model’s assumptions and ours (and, a fortiori, the 2-region model by Forslid and
Ottaviano). While we consider the skilled labour to constitute only fixed costs in the
model, Krugman (1991b) qualified the mobile labour as both fixed and variable costs
in his CP model. It follows that the total cost of production of a firm in location i is
given by:
TCi(xi) = wiα + wLi βxi. (2.4)
In the agricultural sector, however, units are chosen so that one unit of output requires
one unit of unskilled labour L, implying a unit production cost that is equal to the
unskilled nominal wage wLi .
The two types of goods differ in terms of inter-regional mobility. While good A is
frictionless (freely traded across the three regions), trade in good X, on the contrary,
is subject to iceberg costs. In this case, for one unit of the differentiated good to reach
the other region, a firm has to ship τ ∈ [1,+∞) units, since the remainder τ−1 “melts”
in transit. Because the three regions are equidistant from each other, the trade cost
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structure is such that τij = 1, if j = i, and τij = τ otherwise. Inasmuch as the existing
varieties of manufactures are horizontally differentiated and trade costs are the same
across regions, we can establish that a consumer in region i will be indifferent between
a variety from any of the other two regions.
2.2 Short-run equilibrium
We distinguish short-run from long-run equilibrium in that the former takes the spatial
distribution of skilled workers as given and allows us to study the relations between
variables such as skilled workers’ real wages, transport costs and share of local income
spent on manufactures, whereas, in the long-run, we allow skilled workers to migrate
and, hence, equilibrium corresponds to a configuration whereby skilled workers have no
incentives to migrate.
In this subsection we are concerned with short-run equilibrium and obtaining expres-
sions for real wages that will allow us to study long-run equilibria in section 3.1 Some
of the following results are analogous to Forslid and Ottaviano (2003) and are clearly
indicated.
First, looking at the demand side, the representative consumer in region i maximizes
utility (2.1) subject to the following budget constraint:
3∑
j=1
ˆ
sN
pji(s)dji(s)ds+ pAi Ai = Yi, i = {1, 2, 3}, (2.5)
where pAi is the price of the agricultural good, dji(s) is the demand by residents in
location i of a variety produced in location j and pji its price.
The optimization problem yields the following CES demand for dji:
dji(s) =
pji(s)−σ
P 1−σi
µYi, (2.6)
1Migration, as we shall see, depends entirely on indirect utility differentials as given by real wages.
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with the local CES price index Pi associated with (2.2):
Pi =
 3∑
j=1
ˆ
sN
pji(s)1−σds

1
1−σ
. (2.7)
Turning now to the supply side and starting with the agricultural sector, absence of
transport costs in trade of good A means that its price is the same everywhere, so
pA1 = pA2 = pA3 . Furthermore, under perfect competition, we have marginal cost pricing
so that pAi = wLi and we have zero profits for this sector in equilibrium. Consequently,
the aforementioned marginal cost pricing rule implies wage equalization between regions
(wL1 = wL2 = wL3 ). This suggests choosing A as numeraire, so that pAi = wLi = 1. We
assume that the non-full-specialization (NFS) condition (Baldwin et al., 2003) holds,
guaranteeing that agriculture is active in the three regions.2
In the industrial sector, given the fixed cost α in (2.4), skilled labour market clearing
gives us the number of firms in each region in equilibrium (same as in Forslid and
Ottaviano, 2003):
ni =
Hi
α
.
A manufacturing firm in region i facing the total cost in (2.4) maximizes the following
profit function:
∏
i
(s) =
3∑
j=1
pij(s)dij(s)− β
 3∑
j=1
τijdij(s)
− αwi, (2.8)
where wLi = 1. Because total supply to region j 6= i must include the part 1 − τ of
the product that melts away, it is equal to τdij(s, t) . The first order condition for
maximization of (2.8) renders:
pij(s) = τijβ
σ
1− σ . (2.9)
2The condition requires world expenditure on good A to be greater than the maximum total produc-
tion of A in two regions, i.e., (1−µ)YW > 23L, where YW is the global income.This is guaranteed if we
assume that µ < σ/(3σ−2). In the 2-region model by Forslid and Ottaviano (2003), the corresponding
assumption is µ < σ/(2σ − 1).
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This pricing equation is intrinsically different from that of the original CP model in
that it does not depend on the wages of skilled workers, but on the wages of unskilled
workers, which are equalized across regions. It is also equivalent to that of the 2-region
model by Forslid and Ottaviano. This is what renders the FE model solvable. Using
(2.9), the CES price index (2.7) becomes:
Pi = β
σ
1− σ
 3∑
j=1
φijni

1
1−σ
, (2.10)
where φij = τ 1−σij ∈ (0, 1] is what Forslid and Ottaviano have coined with the expression
“freeness of trade”. It increases as the transport costs τ fall, reducing the price index
Pi.
Absence of entrance barriers in the manufacturing industry means that there is free
entry and exit, which translates in zero profits in equilibrium. This implies that op-
erating profits must totally compensate fixed costs in terms of skilled labour and they
are equal to the wages paid to entrepreneurs (i.e., skilled workers), such that:
wi =
3∑
j=1
pij(s)dij(s)− β
 3∑
j=1
τijdij(s)
 ,
which becomes, considering the prices in (2.9):
wi =
βxi
σ − 1 , (2.11)
where xi =
∑
τijdij(s) is total production by a manufacturing firm in region i. Using
(2.6), (2.9) and (2.10), we can derive an expression for xi that depends on the local
incomes and the number of firms of the three regions:
xi =
µ(σ − 1)
βσ
3∑
j=1
φijYi∑3
m=1 φmjnm
. (2.12)
A new expression for the nominal wage can now be derived. Replacing (2.12) in (2.11)
and knowing that ni = Hiα we have:
wi =
µ
σ
3∑
j=1
φijYj
Rj
, (2.13)
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where Rj =
∑3
m=1 φmjHm. By (2.3), income equals:
Yi =
L
3 + wiHi. (2.14)
The endogenous variables ni, pi, wi, xi and Yi can be determined for a given allocation
of skilled workers H. Recall that these results are analogous to those in Forslid and
Ottaviano (2003), with the exception that we are considering a 3-region model. Of
course, it is very straightforward to see that, starting from the 2-region model, building
a n-region FE model would practically be tantamount to building a 3-region one, as we
have done so far. Until this point, that is.3 The only changes required for obtaining
general expressions for n-regions would be changing the superscripts from 3 to n in
the aforementioned summations and changing the amount of unskilled labour in each
region to Li = Ln .
Location decisions by skilled workers from one region to another are assumed to depend
on indirect utility differentials as given by real wages. Hence, it is important to first
derive the system of three linear equations in wi, for i = 1, 2, 3, using (2.13) and (2.14),
that can be solved to obtain the equilibrium skilled (nominal) wages as explicit functions
of the spatial distribution of skilled workers Hi. This is what we do in the following:
Proposition 2.1. The nominal skilled wages in region i are given by:
wi =
µ
σ
L
3

3∑
j=1
φ1j
Rj
+ µ
σ
φ (φ− 1)
∑
k 6=i
Hk∏
k 6=i
Rk
+ φ
2 − 1
Ri
∑
k 6=i
Hk
Rk
+ µ2σ2 (2φ3 − 3φ2 + 1) 1Ri∏
k 6=i
Hk
Rk

1− µ
σ
3∑
j=1
Hj
Rj
+ µ
2
σ2
(1− φ2)
(
H1H2
R1R2
+ H1H3
R1R3
+ H2H3
R2R3
)
− µ
3
σ3
(2φ3 − 3φ2 + 1)
3∏
j=1
Hj
Rj
. (2.15)
Proof. See Appendix A.
Although similar, the 2-region model cannot be derived from the present one by elimi-
nating skilled workers from a single region.
3Some of the further results are already quite cumbersome with only three regions, let alone with
four or more.
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Remark. The 3-region model does not contain the 2-region model in Forslid and Otta-
viano.
Proof. If there is no third region, the unskilled labour L has to be divided equally
between two regions, hence Li = L2 . This changes the structure of the model, as the
local income Yi is now different. We would also have to exclude 1R3 from (2.13). Hence,
simply setting the amount of skilled workers Hi to zero would, thus, not give us the
expression for the nominal skilled wage in the 2-region model (see Forslid and Ottaviano,
2003). In other words, although similar, the 2-region model cannot be derived from the
present one by eliminating skilled workers from a single region.
The nominal skilled wages can also be expressed as functions of the share of skilled
workers in each region, hi =
Hi
H
. Furthermore, we can conveniently omit one of the
regions in our analysis, since Hk = H−Hi−Hj, with i, j, k = {1, 2, 3}, and define region
k implicitly as function of regions i and j. This allows us to limit our analysis of the
dynamics on the 2-simplex (because hi+hj+hk = 1). Taking this into consideration, we
can rewrite the numerator and denominator of (2.15), and therefore the nominal wage
wi, in terms of hi and hj, leaving out region hk, as it is implicitly defined a function of
hi and hj:
wi (hi, hj) =
Dwi (hi, hj)
D (hi, hj)
,
where
Dwi =
µ
σ
L
3
1
H
{ 3∑
m=1
φim
rm
+ µ
σ
[
φ (φ− 1) hj + hk
rjrk
+ φ
2 − 1
ri
(
hj
rj
+ hk
rk
)]
+
+µ
2
σ2
(
2φ3 − 3φ2 + 1) 1
ri
hjhk
rjrk
}
, (2.16)
D = 1− µ
σ
3∑
j=1
hj
rj
+ µ
2
σ2
(
1− φ2)(h1h2
r1r2
+ h1h3
r1r3
+ h2h3
r2r3
)
−µ
3
σ3
(
2φ3 − 3φ2 + 1) h1h2h3
r1r2r3
, (2.17)
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with ri = RiH . Obviously, we have rk = 1 + (φ − 1)(hi + hj), since hk = 1 − hi − hj4.
This form of presentation is convenient for derivation purposes. Additionally, the price
index Pi becomes, after (2.9):
Pi(hi, hj) = β
σ
σ − 1
(
H
α
ri
) 11−σ
. (2.18)
4It does no harm to express D directly a function of h1, h2 and h3, as can be understood by reading
Appendix A.
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3 Long-run equilibria and stability
Recall that skilled workers are assumed to base their location decisions on the difference
between each region’s real wage and the weighted average real wage in the three regions.
This assumption follows Krugman (1991b) in that it states that the skilled workers are
short sighted and migrate to the location that offers them the highest indirect utility.
We define long-run equilibria1 as distributions of skilled workers that remain unchanged
over time. An equilibrium is stable if, after occurrence of some small exogenous migra-
tion of skilled workers to any of the regions, the spatial distribution of skilled workers
is pulled back to the initial one. The next paragraph contains a brief description of the
dynamical system of the 2-region FE model by Forslid and Ottaviano, since it is the
benchmark to our 3-region model.
In the 2-region FE model, skilled worker migration follows a simple Marshallian adjust-
ment2, whereby the rate of change of skilled workers in one region depends on the real
wage differential between the two regions adjusted by some positive real parameter. If
the real wage in region i is higher than in region j, skilled workers in region j will mi-
grate to region i. Since the shares of skilled workers in the two regions sum up to unity,
the authors chose to study the dynamics through the perspective of one region only,
with h being the share of skilled workers in that region. Naturally, the share of skilled
workers in the other region is implicitly defined as 1− h, so studying the dynamics in
one region renders complete information on the dynamics in general. Working with two
regions pertains to studying dynamics on a 1-simplex, that is, a line segment where h
goes from zero to unity. The dynamics are well defined so as to capture both interior
and boundary dynamics3. As a consequence of their formulation, interior equilibria
(h = 12) always exist, whereas corner solutions (h = 0 and h = 1) are not necessarily
equilibria. However, when they are equilibria, they are necessarily stable.
Turning to our 3-region FE model, dynamics are described in a straightforward way,
1Hereinafter, we shall refer to long-run equilibria just as equilibria.
2See Forslid and Ottaviano (2003: 234-235).
3This refers to dynamics at points placed on the boundaries of the simplex. These correspond to
h = 0 or h = 1, i.e., the boundaries of the line segment.
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albeit different from that in the 2-region model. Workers migrate to a region if the wage
in that region is higher than the weighted average real wage of the three regions, unless
the former is initially absent of skilled workers, in which case it will be left empty unless
there is some exogenous migration to that region. Choosing to leave the dynamics in
region 3 implicitly defined4, without loss of generality, the migration dynamics of skilled
workers are determined by the following system:
h˙1 = ∆ω1 = (ω1 − ω¯)h1h˙2 = ∆ω2 = (ω2 − ω¯)h2 , h1, h2 ∈ [0, 1] , (3.1)
where ωi = wiPµi stands for the real wage in region i and ω¯ (h1, h2) = h1ω1 + h2ω2 + h3ω3
is the weighted real wage average of wages in the three regions. The equations of the
system are ad hoc migration equations, a standard formulation in many NEG models’
dynamics, such as in the Core Periphery model in Fujita et al. (1999)5 and in the
version of the FE model in Baldwin et al. (2003) based on the original FE model by
Forslid and Ottaviano (2003). It clearly shows that the rate of change of the share of
skilled workers is proportional to the real wage differential. We have dynamics subject
to a two-dimensional simplex (an equilateral triangle) whose boundaries correspond to
configurations (h1, h2) such that one of the regions is left absent of skilled workers. Such
configurations pertain to either h1 = 0, h2 = 0, or h1 + h2 = 1⇔ h3 = 0.
Most criticism towards the ad hoc migration equations concern the fact that there is no
motion when skilled workers are fully agglomerated in one region, even if there are non-
null real wage differentials (Matsuyama, 1991) at such configurations, hence preventing
us from explaining the lack of motion when this is the case. We should then just briefly
clarify why the ad hoc migration equations are used in this dissertation.
It would seem as if the dynamics could be explained in a more straightforward way if
we did not multiply each wage differential by the share hi. However, we are dealing
with both interior and boundary dynamics, which are more complex in a 3-region model
4That is, h3 = 1− h1 − h2.
5They justify its use on the grounds that their CP model might be regarded as an evolutionary game.
Evolutionary game theory recurrently use “replicator dynamics” in the fashion of such equations.
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than in the 2-region model. The extra hi in each equation is necessary to guarantee that
the rate of change of skilled workers in each region is null when that region is absent of
skilled workers. The absence of the extra hi would leave the dynamics ill-defined at the
boundaries. For instance, imagine that both regions 2 and 3 have no skilled workers.
The average real wage ω¯ is equal to the real wage in region 1, ω1, so we would have a
null wage differential ∆ω1, but a differential ∆ω2 whose signal would depend on which
real wage was higher, ω1 or ω2. Assume, hypothetically, that the real wage is higher in
region 2. It follows that h˙1 = 0 and h˙2 > 0. Furthermore, h˙3 = −h˙2 < 0. But symmetry
between regions means that when both regions 2 and 3 are absent of skilled workers
and their real wages are equal, then their rates of change should be the same, hence
h˙3 > 0, which is a contradiction. The system would not give us enough information on
the dynamics at the boundaries. On the other hand, the migration equation commonly
used assures that both rates of change are equal to zero, when the regions are empty6.
Furthermore, assuming the mentioned hypothetical dynamics, one could easily verify
that the dynamic properties of a configuration such as (1, 0, 0) would be different from
that of (0, 0, 1), so agglomerating in region 1 would be different from concentrating
in region 3 as far as stability is concerned, which makes no sense since we have three
regions that are identical. With the formulation implicit in the migration equation, all
three regions are treated symmetrically.7 Hence, the dynamics implicit in the migration
equation in (3.1) are more suitable for our analysis. Next, we address the equilibria of
(3.1).
Based on what we have argued above, we cannot say that equilibria are strictly con-
figurations at which there are no endogenous incentives to migrate from one region to
another. This is because we have no migration at corner solutions, even if there are
non-null real wage differentials. Hence, we shall use the more straightforward definition
of equilibria: Configurations that satisfy h˙1, h˙2 = 0 are all equilibria. By direct sub-
stitution, it is then easy to see that the configurations (h1, h2, h3) = (1, 0, 0) ,
(
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3
)
,
,
(
0, 12 ,
1
2
)
8 and their permutations are all equilibria of (3.1). The first one consists of
6This was already argued by Baldwin et al. (2003).
7We have h˙3 = −h˙1 − h˙2 = . . . = h3(ω3 − ω¯).
8Recall that, since h3 = 1 − h1 − h2, we are still working in two coordinates. For instance, the
configuration (0, a, 1− a) is equivalent to (h1, h2) = (0, a).
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full agglomeration of industry in one of the regions, leaving the other two without any
skilled workers. We call this “concentration” (or full agglomeration). The second cor-
responds to an equilibrium for which skilled workers are equally dispersed across the
three regions. This is “total dispersion”. Finally, the third configuration represents an
outcome whereby skilled workers are equally dispersed across two of the three regions.
This is referred to as “partial dispersion”.
A relevant difference between the postulated dynamics of our 3-region model and those
of the 2-region model by Forslid and Ottaviano is that corner solutions are always
equilibria of the system in (3.1), whereas the corresponding corner configurations may
not be equilibria in the 2-region FE model.
A key ingredient in the description of the dynamics of skilled workers in NEG models
is the study of stability of the following three configurations: concentration, total and
partial dispersion. The equilibrium corresponding to total dispersion is fully symmetric,
while the other two are partially symmetric.9 The stability of each equilibrium is
preserved by permutation so that the same stability conditions hold for concentration
or partial dispersion in any of the regions.
Equilibria are stable if, due to occurrence of some exogenous migration of skilled workers
to any of the regions, the spatial distribution of skilled workers is pulled back to the
initial one. We have the following result concerning configurations that are placed on
a boundary of the 2-simplex:
Proposition 3.1. A necessary condition for the stability of an equilibrium such that
hi = 0 is:
ωi < ω¯.
Proof. Considering an equilibrium with hi = 0, if the real wage in region i is lower than
the average real wage ω¯, then continuity of real wages in the share of skilled workers
ensures that there is a point in a neighbourhood of that equilibrium where ωi < ω¯.
Thus, if there was a marginal and exogenous migration of skilled workers from any
9We can permute either the populated or unpopulated regions but not all of the three regions.
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region j 6= i to region i, a negative wage differential ∆ωi would drive away all the
skilled workers from region i back to the region of origin until hi = 0.
Notice that the previous is not sufficient.
As a side note, we should mention that we shall refrain from recurring to the standard
eigenvalues study of the Jacobian matrix at equilibria located on the boundaries of the
2-simplex. This is because at boundary configurations such as (1, 0) or (0, 12) boundary
dynamics impose constraints on interpreting the meaning of some partial derivatives at
points located on it.
3.1 Stability of concentration
As mentioned previously, the configuration (h1, h2, h3) = (1, 0, 0)10 is an equilibrium of
(3.1). If region 2 and 3 are both absent of any skilled workers, then, by symmetry, it
must hold that ω2 = ω3, which can be easily verified using (2.15) to compare w2(1, 0, 0)
with w3(1, 0, 0) and noticing that, by (2.18), P2(1, 0) = P3(1, 0). The equilibrium is a
corner solution placed on a vertex of the 2-simplex, since we have two empty regions.
Lemma 3.2. At the configuration (1, 0), the necessary condition of proposition 3.1 is
also sufficient.
Proof. By proposition 3.1, a necessary condition for concentration to be a stable equi-
librium is
ω2 < ω¯ = h1ω1 = ω1,
which is also a sufficient condition. This is because we have both h2 = 0 and h3 = 0 and
we already know that ω2 = ω3. Comparing region 1 with region 2 is, thus, tantamount
to comparing region 1 with region 3, so we only need the former if we are to address
stability of concentration.
10We alternate between showing and omitting h3 for the purpose of convenience of presentation only.
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Put in economic terms, if region 2 and 3 are to remain empty over time, then there can
be no incentives for skilled workers to migrate to other regions, meaning their indirect
utility must be higher in region 1 compared to the other regions. This implies that
skilled workers should receive a higher real wage in region 1, that is:
w1
P µ1
>
w2
P µ2
⇔ w1
w2
> τµ
⇔ w1
w2
> φ
µ
1−σ ,
giving us a necessary and sufficient condition for the stability of the concentration
configuration11.
Proposition 3.3. Full agglomeration is a stable equilibrium if and only if:
SP (φ) ≡ 1− µ
σ
+
(
1− µ
σ
)
φ+
(
1 + 2µ
σ
)
φ2 − 3φ
µ
1−σ+1 < 0. (3.2)
Proof. For simplicity, we determine the condition for stability of the configuration
(h1, h2) = (1, 0) using the equivalent configuration (H1, H2, H3) = (H, 0, 0) and the
equations in (2.13) and (2.14). This implies finding w1 (H, 0, 0) and w2 (H, 0, 0). After
(2.15) we have:
w1 (H, 0, 0) =
µ
σ
L
H
1
1− µ
σ
⇔ w1 (H, 0, 0) = µ
σ − µ
L
H
,
11Even if we do not present calculations based on the study of the Jacobian, one can verify that the
conditions resulting from it are equivalent to those we have obtained.
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As for the nominal wage in region 2:
w2 (H, 0, 0) =
µ
σ
L
3
[
1
φH
+ φ
H
+ φ
φH
+ µ
σ
(
2φ2 − φ− 1
φH
)]
⇔ w2 (H, 0, 0) = µ
σ
L
3
1
φH
[
φ2 + φ+ 1 + µ
σ
(
2φ2 − φ− 1
)]
.
Substitution of nominal wages renders:
w1
w2
> φ
µ
1−σ ⇔
3φ
φ2 + φ+ 1 + µ
σ
(2φ2 − φ− 1)
> φ
µ
1−σ ⇔
φ2 + φ+ 1 + µ
σ
(
2φ2 − φ− 1
)
< 3φ
µ
1−σ+1 ⇔
1− µ
σ
+
(
1− µ
σ
)
φ+
(
1 + 2µ
σ
)
φ2 − 3φ
µ
1−σ+1 < 0.
Corollary. If σ = 1 + µ then SP (φ) < 0, ∀φ ∈ (0, 1].
Proof. This is straightforward by substitution in SP (φ).
♠ Hereinafter, we shall assume that σ > 1 + µ.
This is the equivalent to the “no-black-hole” condition of the CP model by Krugman
(1991b) and is the exact same condition found by Forslid and Ottaviano (2003) in their
2-region model. Numerous simulations suggest that, if σ < 1 + µ, concentration is also
always stable12. The underlying economic interpretation is that, unless the elasticity
of substitution σ is high enough, that is, if skilled workers do not value enough variety
12However, this cannot be assessed analytically. What we can doubtlessly say is that, if this condition
is not verified, then the total dispersion configuration can never be a stable equilibrium. Detailed
explanation on the derivation of this condition will be given in Section 3.2, where we address the
stability of total dispersion.
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in the composite good X, then concentration in one single region is always a stable
equilibrium.
Proposition 3.4. SP (φ) has exactly two roots in φ ∈ (0, 1], φ = 1 and φs ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. It is straightforward to see that SP (1) = 0 by direct substitution in (3.2),
therefore φ = 1 is a root of SP (φ). Also:
SP (0) = 1− µ
σ
> 0.
Taking the first derivative of SP (φ) with respect to φ we obtain:
dSP
dφ
=
(
1− µ
σ
)
+ 2
(
1 + 2µ
σ
)
φ−
(
µ
1− σ + 1
)
3φ
µ
1−σ ,
therefore, we have:
dSP
dφ
(1) = 3µ
σ
1− 2σ
1− σ > 0,
which, knowing that SP (1) = 0 and SP (0) > 0, ensures that there is a minimum to
the left of SP (1) such that minφ SP (φ) < 0. It also follows that there exists a zero φs
of SP (φ) between 0 and 1.
Finally, to show that φs is the only zero in (0, 1), note that SP (φ) is convex between 0
and 1:
d2SP
dφ2
(φ) = 2
(
1 + 2µ
σ
)
− µ1− σ
(
µ
1− σ + 1
)
3φ
µ
1−σ−1,
which is always positive since σ > 1+µ. Given that SP (φ) is continuous in its domain,
the previous conditions ensure that there exists a zero of SP (φ) , φs ∈ (0, 1), and that
it is unique.
The value φs < 1 whose existence is guaranteed in proposition 3.4 is the 3-region
“sustain point” (name used by Fujita et al., 1999). It is the threshold of φ above which
concentration is a stable equilibrium. It is expected that, for a high enough freeness
of trade, or, conversely, for low enough transport costs, full agglomeration of industry
in one of the regions is a stable outcome. This is because low transport costs means
that price indices become relatively higher in the regions that are deserted and thus
real wages become relatively lower.
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Although we have determined a necessary and sufficient condition for stability of con-
centration, we were not able to derive an analytical expression for the sustain point φs.
However, we are able to derive a more restrictive condition for stability of agglomera-
tion, giving us an explicit value of φ that we can work with.
Proposition 3.5. Concentration is stable if φ > φss =
σ − µ
σ + 2µ.
Proof. Consider the condition derived in (3.2). We can state the following:
SP (φ) < 1− µ
σ
+
(
1− µ
σ
)
φ+
(
1 + 2µ
σ
)
φ2 − 3φ,
since µ1−σ + 1 < 1. Rearranging the expression to the right-hand side of the inequality
above, and equating it to zero, entails:
σ − µ+ (σ − µ)φ+ (σ + 2µ)φ2 − 3φσ = 0⇔
⇔ φss = σ − µ
σ + 2µ.
Hence, knowing, that φss > φs, we can say that concentration is stable if φ > φss.
Notice that this condition is sufficient only and might be too restrictive, as it requires
transport costs below those that would already allow for stability of concentration.
Proposition 3.6. As σ approaches infinity or µ approaches zero, concentration becomes
an unstable equilibrium.
Proof. We already know that full agglomeration is only stable if SP (φ) < 0. However,
notice the following limits:
lim
σ→∞SP (φ) = (φ− 1)
2 and lim
µ→0SP (φ) = (φ− 1)
2.
This means that φs → 1. For a given φ ∈ (0, 1), concentration becomes unstable for a
sufficiently high σ or a sufficiently low µ.
Proposition 3.6 handles two limit cases whereby concentration can never be a stable
outcome. The first limit case (µ → 0) refers to a situation of absence of the manufac-
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turing sector, as if µ approaches zero, there is no local income spent on manufactures.
The second one corresponds to the manufacturing sector operating under perfect com-
petition, since σ close to infinity means that variety in good X is not valued at all, so
it is as if X were a homogenous good.
3.1.1 Comparing concentration in the 3-region and 2-region models
An interesting result would be to compare the 3-region model with the 2-region one
in terms of stability of full agglomeration in one region. In Castro et al. (2009), it is
proven that, in an extension of Krugman’s CP model to three regions, more regions
favour concentration as an outcome. Here, we obtain the following analogous result.
Proposition 3.7. The parameter region for which concentration is stable in the 3-region
model contains that in the 2-region model.
Proof. In the model with two regions, following Forslid and Ottaviano (2003), concen-
tration is a stable outcome for the 2-region model if:
1− µ
σ
+
(
1 + µ
σ
)
φ2 − 2φ
µ
1−σ+1 ≤ 0. (3.3)
The difference between the left-hand sides (LHS) in (3.3) and (3.2) is given by:
DSP (φ, µ, σ) = LHS(3.3)− LHS(3.2) = µ
σ
φ(1− φ) + φ
(
φ
µ
1−σ − 1
)
. (3.4)
By inspection of (3.4):
1 > φ and φ
µ
1−σ > 1,
thus DSP is always positive. Thus, if the concentration configuration is stable in the
FE model with two regions, then it is also stable in the model with three regions.
In other words, the 3-region model favours concentration over the 2-region model. In
figure 3.1 we plot the curves depicting the stability conditions of the 2-region and 3-
region models. The dashed curve represents the function SP (φ) for the 2-region model
and the other one corresponds to the homologous function for the 3-region model, for
µ = 0.4 and σ = 5. One can see clearly that SP (φ) becomes negative for a lower φs
23
in the 3-region case, thus illustrating the wider area of stability of concentration in the
3-region model compared to the model with two regions.
Φs,2
Φs,30 1
Φ
SP2HΦL, SP3HΦL
Stabilityof concentrationfor 2 and 3 regions
Figure 3.1 – Setting the parameters µ = 0.4 and σ = 5, we plot the functions SP2(φ)
(dashed) and SP3(φ) (solid). Since concentration is stable to the right of the zeros, we see
that concentration in the 3-region model is a sufficient condition for that of the 2-region
model.
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SP2HΦ,ΣL, SP3HΦ,ΣL < 0; Μ=0.4
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SP2HΦ,ΜL, SP3HΦ,ΜL < 0; Σ=5
Figure 3.2 – Darker region represents region of stability for the 2-region model (SP2 < 0).
The lighter one represents stability for the 3-region model (SP3 < 0) and clearly contains
that of the 2-region model. On the left, µ is fixed and SP is plotted as a function of both
φ and σ. On the right, σ is fixed.
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Figure 3.2 illustrates the previous proposition for a wider array of values of µ and σ.
The picture to the left shows the region where SP (φ, σ) < 0, that is the region of
stability of full agglomeration, for both the 2-region and 3-region models, for every φ
and σ and fixed µ = 0.4. The picture to the right has the same meaning except that
we set σ = 5 and display SP (φ, µ) < 0. In both pictures it is obvious that the region
where concentration is a stable outcome in the 3-region model (lighter area) contains
that in the 2-region model (darker area).
Numerical results also indicate that the difference in the critical areas between the two
regions gets smaller as σ increases and/or µ decreases.
Proposition 3.8. As σ approaches infinity or µ approaches zero, the stability conditions
for the concentration configuration in the 2-region and 3-region models become identical.
Proof. If the difference DSP in (3.4) equals zero, then the conditions for stability in the
2 and 3-region FE models coincide.
Indeed, we have:
lim
µ→0DSP = −φ+ φ = 0 and limσ→∞DSP = −φ+ φ = 0,
concluding the proof.
Intuitively, and not surprisingly, what is here patent is that a smaller weight of the
manufacturing sector in the whole economy reduces the relevance of the number of
regions considered in that same economy, for the purpose of determining industry lo-
cation. The same can be said in the case of a manufacturing sector whose variety in its
good X is less valued by consumers. Note however that, by proposition 3.6, the limit
cases correspond to a scenario where concentration is never stable in either the 2-region
or the 3-region model.
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3.2 Stability of total dispersion
Stability of an outcome where skilled workers remain equally divided across the three
regions, i.e. (h1, h2, h3) =
(
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3
)
, is determined by the eigenvalues of the Jacobian
matrix of the system in (3.1):
J =

∂∆ω1
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
∂h1
∂∆ω1
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
∂h2
∂∆ω2
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
∂h1
∂∆ω2
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
∂h2
 .
The region under whose perspective we are going to analyze the stability of total dis-
persion is a matter of choice, since the regions are all identical. Invoking this symmetry
between regions, if h1 = h2 and ω1 (h1, h2) = ω2 (h2, h1), then ∂ω1∂h1
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
= ∂ω2
∂h2
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
and ∂ω1
∂h2
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
= ∂ω2
∂h1
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
. Furthermore, it is obvious that ∂ω¯
∂h1
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
= ∂ω¯
∂h2
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
.
Therefore, the Jacobian J at total dispersion corresponds to:
J =
α β
β α
 .
Concerning the real wage average ω¯ we provide the following results:
Proposition 3.9. Configurations of the form hi = 1−hj2 , with 0 < hi < 1, entail
∂ω¯
∂hi
= 0.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Proposition 3.10. The weighted real wage average ω¯ attains a critical value when
skilled workers are equally dispersed across regions.
Proof. By proposition 3.9, we can conclude that both ∂ω¯
∂h1
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
and ∂ω¯
∂h2
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
are zero,
since h1 = 1−h22 and also h2 =
1−h1
2 . Because both partial derivatives are equal to zero,
it means that the real wage average is at a critical value at total dispersion.
We can now simplify α and β in the Jacobian:
β = ∂ω1
∂h2
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
and α = ∂ω1
∂h1
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
.
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Lemma 3.11. At
(
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3
)
we have ∂ωi
∂hj
= 0, ∀i, j 6= i.
Proof. Assume, by way of contradiction, that ∂ω1
∂h2
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
> 0. It must follow that,
for a small ε > 0, ω1
(
1
3 ,
1
3 + ε,
1
3 − ε
)
> ω1
(
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3
)
. However, the real wage in one
region is invariant to the permutation of the share of skilled workers in the other
two regions. Therefore, ω1
(
1
3 ,
1
3 + ε,
1
3 − ε
)
= ω1
(
1
3 ,
1
3 − ε, 13 + ε
)
. But saying that
ω1
(
1
3 ,
1
3 − ε, 13 + ε
)
> ω1
(
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3
)
is a contradiction. Hence, ∂ω1
∂h2
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
= 0. Symmetry
establishes an analogous result for ∂ω2
∂h1
.
On account of the previous propositions and lemma, we are able to rewrite the Jacobian
matrix at
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
as:
J =
α 0
0 α
 .
The matrix has a double eigenvalue equal to α and total dispersion is equivalent to:
α = ∂ω1
∂h1
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
< 0. (3.5)
Stability of total dispersion depends only on whether a small increase in the share of
skilled workers in region i leads to a decrease in the real wage in that same region. In
accordance with the definition of stable equilibria, as explained in the beginning of this
section, the previous statement is tantamount to saying that total dispersion can only be
stable if, after an exogenous migration to one of the regions, say region 2, the real wage
falls under the average real wage level, thus inducing skilled workers to migrate back to
the regions they left (h˙1 < 0) and restore the initial distribution. This is exactly what
the condition in (3.5) stands for. Of course, since total dispersion is a fully symmetric
equilibrium, this enables us to generalize the latter result considering any region. Thus,
we need only to study what happens when there is exogenous migration to one of the
regions, as it is the same as if it happened to any of the other two regions.
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The condition for stability of total dispersion is tantamount to:
∂ω1
∂h1
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
< 0 ⇔ ∂w1
∂hi
P µ1 −
∂P µ1
∂hi
w1 < 0⇔
∂w1
∂h1
w1
<
∂P µ1
∂h1
P µ1
.
This inequality enables us to relate stability of dispersion in terms of semi-elasticities.
Skilled workers remain equally dispersed across the three regions if an increase in the
percentage of skilled workers in a region induces a percentage change in the nominal
wage smaller than the corresponding percentage change in the real prices. In other
words, a loss in real purchase power due to an increase of the share of skilled workers hi
in a region leads to an exodus of some skilled workers from that region until the initial
share of skilled workers is restored, that is, until hi = 13 .
13
Proposition 3.12. Total dispersion is a stable equilibrium if and only if:
BP (φ) = µ2(φ− 1) + (σ − 1)σ(φ− 1) + µ(−1 + 2σ)(1 + 2φ) < 0. (3.6)
Proof. See Appendix C.1.
Here, the critical value φb such that BP (φb) = 0 is called the “break point”, following
the terminology of Fujita et al. (1999):
BP (φb) = 0 ⇔ φb = µ+ µ
2 − σ − 2µσ + σ2
−2µ+ µ2 − σ + 4µσ + σ2 ⇔
⇔ φb = (µ− σ)(1 + µ− σ)
µ2 + (−1 + σ)σ + µ(−2 + 4σ) . (3.7)
It is also the only zero since (3.6) is clearly linear in φ.
Stability of total dispersion happens for values of BP (φ) such that φ < φb. That said,
13Dividing both sides of the inequalities by h1 renders a similar relation in terms of elasticities. In
the present case, however, semi-elasticities fit better with intuition, insofar as h1 is the percentage of
skilled workers in region 1.
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if φb is negative, total dispersion is never a stable outcome. Like Forslid and Ottaviano
(2003), we rule out this possibility by finding the threshold value of σ such that:
φb ≥ 0⇔
(µ− σ)(1 + µ− σ) ≥ 0⇔
σ ≥ 1 + µ.
Hence, the “no-black-hole” condition (σ > 1 + µ) implies that φb is positive. A high
φ, corresponding to low transport costs, naturally discourages dispersion in favour of
concentration. It seems reasonable to claim that a higher percentage of local income
spent on manufactures and a higher preference for variety of manufactures also favour
total dispersion of skilled workers.
Proposition 3.13. As σ approaches infinity or µ approaches zero, total dispersion is
a stable outcome for all values of φ.
Proof. Considering the value φb in (3.7) we have the following limits:
lim
σ→∞φb(µ, σ) = limσ→∞
(µ− σ)(1 + µ− σ)
µ2 + (−1 + σ)σ + µ(−2 + 4σ) = limσ→∞
−1− 2µ+ 2σ
−1 + 4µ+ 2σ = 1
and
lim
µ→0φb(µ, σ) = limµ→0
(µ− σ)(1 + µ− σ)
µ2 + (−1 + σ)σ + µ(−2 + 4σ) =
σ(σ − 1)
(−1 + σ)σ = 1.
Since total dispersion is a stable outcome for φ < φb = 1 and φ ∈ (0, 1), we can say
that total dispersion is always a stable outcome as µ approaches zero and σ approaches
infinity.
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3.2.1 Comparing total dispersion in the 3-region and 2-region models
We compared stability conditions of full agglomeration outcomes in the 2 and 3-region
models. These, although suggestive, do not extend to a comparison for the stability of
total dispersion. The following propositions in this section allow us to fill this gap.
Proposition 3.14. The parameter region for which concentration is stable in the 2-
region model contains that of the 3-region model.
Proof. In the article by Forslid and Ottaviano (2003), the authors determined the break-
point value φb,2 for the model with two regions which is presented as follows:
φb,2 = φw
σ − 1− µ
σ − 1 + µ,
where
φw ∈ (0, 1) = σ − µ
σ + µ
is a threshold value of φ above (below) which the region with more skilled workers offers
a higher (lower) skilled worker wage wi. Subtracting the 3-region break-point in (3.7)
to this one yields:
DBP = φb,2 − φb = (µ− σ)(1 + µ− σ)(−1 + µ+ σ)(µ+ σ) −
(µ− σ)(1 + µ− σ)
µ2 + (−1 + σ)σ + µ(−2 + 4σ) ⇔
⇔ DBP = µ(µ− σ)(1 + µ− σ)(−1 + 2σ)(−1 + µ+ σ)(µ+ σ) (µ2 + (−1 + σ)σ + µ(−2 + 4σ)) .
The denominator is clearly positive and, provided that the “no-black-hole” condition
holds, the numerator is also positive. Hence, DBP > 0, ∀µ, σ. This means that the crit-
ical value φb is lower in the 3-region model compared to the 2-region model. Therefore,
dispersion is a more likely outcome in the model with two regions.
Not surprisingly, this result is the opposite to the one proved for the concentration
configuration. Considering both results, we can now conclude that the 3-region model
indeed favours concentration over dispersion when compared to the 2-region model by
Forslid and Ottaviano (2003).
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Lastly, we have the following proposition concerning, yet again, the limit cases of a non-
existent manufacturing industry and when the latter is very close to perfect competition.
Proposition 3.15. As µ approaches zero or as σ approaches infinity, the stability
conditions for the 2 and 3-region FE models coincide.
Proof. We have the following limits:
lim
µ→0DBP =
0
[(−1 + σ)σ]2 = 0 and limσ→∞DBP = 0
14.
Inasmuch as the difference between the break-points in the two models is zero con-
sidering the limits above, the conditions for stability of total dispersion become the
same.
Taking propositions 3.13 and 3.15 together, we can conclude that, considering the FE
model with two or three regions, total dispersion is always a stable outcome when we
are either approaching an economy absent of industry or consumers give almost no
value to variety in good X. This fits well with intuition.
3.3 Simultaneity of concentration and total dispersion
Numerical inspection of the conditions of concentration and total dispersion in (3.2)
and (3.6) suggests that, for every pair (µ, σ), there exists φ ∈ (0, 1), for which both
total dispersion and concentration are stable equilibria. In order to illustrate this in a
clear way, we first set µ = 0.4 and display the two dimensional regions SP (φ, σ) < 0
and BP (φ, σ) < 0 in one picture. Next, we plot SP (φ, µ) < 0 and BP (φ, µ) < 0 by
setting σ = 0.5, in the same fashion as in the previous section. Figure 3.3 illustrates
this situation. The intersection between the two regions is clear in both pictures and
enables us to conclude that there is indeed a region in parameter space where both full
agglomeration and total dispersion are stable outcomes.
14Notice that the numerator is a polynomial function of σ of degree 3 and the denominator is a
polynomial function of σ of degree 4 and, therefore, the limit equals zero.
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Figure 3.3 – Simultaneity of stability of concentration and total dispersion. One re-
gion (bottom left on the picture to the left and upper right on the picture to the right)
corresponds to stability of concentration and the other corresponds to stability of to-
tal dispersion. They overlap each other in the darker region in the middle, where both
equilibria are stable outcomes.
If this is true, then it must hold that φs < φb, because concentration is only stable for
φ > φs, while the region for stability of total dispersion implies φ < φb. If it does hold,
then we have hysteresis in location (Forslid and Ottaviano, 2003), because transport
costs have to rise above the corresponding break point in order for total dispersion to be
unstable, even if concentration is already a stable equilibrium. If both equilibria are to
be simultaneously stable, we must have SP (φb) < 0, ∀µ, σ. Again, this seems to be the
case, however, nonlinearity of SP in φ makes it impossible to prove this analytically.
Further inspection also seems to suggest that the distance between φs and φb is bigger
for parameter values near the “no-black-hole” condition.
Proposition 3.16. There is an open subset in parameter space (φ, σ, µ) in which both
concentration and total dispersion are stable outcomes.
Proof. Consider the point in the parameter space (φ, σ, µ) =
(
3
5 , 5,
2
5
)
.15
15This point was chosen by numerical inspection.
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At this point, we have:
SP
(
3
5 , 5,
2
5
)
< 0 and BP
(
3
5 , 5,
2
5
)
< 0.
Therefore, for (φ, σ, µ) =
(
3
5 , 5,
2
5
)
, both concentration and total dispersion are stable
equilibria. Since SP and BP are continuous functions of (φ, σ, µ), we know the signs
persist in a open neighbourhood of
(
3
5 , 5,
2
5
)
.
We know for sure that concentration and total dispersion can be stable outcomes at the
same time, even though we cannot define analytically the region where this happens.
This also holds in the case of the 2-region model by Forslid and Ottaviano (2003).
Figure 3.4 seems to suggest that it is always possible to find a value of φ, for any pair
of µ and σ, such that both agglomeration and total dispersion are stable outcomes.
One can see the surfaces corresponding to SP (φ) = 0 and BP (φ) = 0. In between the
surfaces, there is simultaneity of stability and total dispersion, which is less likely for
higher values of φ.
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Figure 3.4 – We have the surfaces SP = 0 and BP = 0 in the parameter space (resp.
top and bottom surfaces). Concentration and total dispersion are both stable in between
both surfaces, where we have SP < 0 ∩BP < 0.
However, the region between the surfaces is very thin, and becomes thinner for a high
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σ and/or low µ, thus making it harder to visualize simultaneity of concentration and
total dispersion.
On a final note, consider again the limit cases, with σ tending to infinity and µ to
zero, along with propositions 3.13 and 3.6. Since these pertain to cases where both the
sustain point φs and the break point φb converge to unity (the corresponding transport
costs converging to zero), there is no simultaneity of stability of equilibria. In fact, the
aforementioned cases rule out the possibility of full agglomeration in detriment of total
dispersion (which will be always stable). All these results also pertain to the 2-region
model by Forslid and Ottaviano (2003), as given by propositions 3.8 and 3.15. This
complements their results concerning convergence between the sustain point and break
point when the manufacturing sector approaches perfect competition.
3.4 Stability of partial dispersion
The last relevant equilibrium is that for which all skilled workers are equally dispersed
across two of the three regions, leaving the remaining region empty. Qualitatively, this
configuration differs from the configuration
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
in the 2-region model, meaning that
the model with three regions is intrinsically different (see Castro et al., 2009). Using the
freedom of choice provided by symmetry, we look at the point (h1, h2, h3) =
(
0, 12 ,
1
2
)
.
Since h1 = 0, we know, by proposition 3.1, that if partial dispersion is to be stable, we
must have:
ω1 < ω2.
On the other hand, unlike in the case of concentration, this is not a sufficient condition.
This condition states that, when
(
0, 12
)
is indeed an equilibrium, after an exogenous
(and marginal) increase in h116, the latter will eventually drop back to zero, since skilled
workers expect to receive a higher real wage in any of the other regions.17 Thus, this
condition asserts that, after a deviation from the boundary of the simplex corresponding
16We can only consider positive variations in h1 as we are on the boundary respective to h1 = 0.
17Recall that ω2 and ω3 are equal at
(
0, 12
)
.
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to h1 = 0, the spatial distribution will return to a point on that same boundary.
Yet, this condition is not sufficient because we are only comparing region 1 with regions
2 and 3. We need to ensure not only that h1 will remain zero but also that h2 = h3,
i.e., h2 = 12 , in order to ensure convergence along the boundary (to the equilibrium). In
economic terms, if any of the skilled workers migrates, e.g. to region 2, we need them
to want to return to region 3 (symmetry implies the same in the opposite direction).
This is achieved when an increase in h2 leads to a decrease in the difference between
the real wage ω2 and the real wage average ω¯:
∂∆ω2
∂h2
= ∂ω2
∂h2
(
0, 12
)
− ∂ω¯
∂h2
(
0, 12
)
< 0.
However, since we have h2 = 1−h12 at
(
0, 12
)
, proposition 3.9 asserts that ∂ω¯
∂h2
(
0, 12
)
= 0.
Again, as in total dispersion, intuition tells us that we need only consider what happens
to the real wage (considering only directions along the boundary respective to h1 = 0,
that is). This is because at partial dispersion the real wage ω2 and ω¯ are equal. So,
should ω2 fall after an increase in h2, this will be enough to drive skilled workers out of
region 2 back to where the real wage is now relatively higher.
Proposition 3.17. Thus, we have the following necessary and sufficient conditions for
stability of partial dispersion18: 
ξ ≡ ω1 − ω2 < 0
β ≡ ∂ω2
∂h2
(
0, 12
)
< 0.
The configuration of partial dispersion
(
0, 12 ,
1
2
)
is stable if and only if:

ξ < 0⇔ σ + µ(−1 + φ)(1 + 2φ) + σφ
[
1 + 4φ− 3
(
2 φ1+φ
) µ
1−σ (1 + φ)
]
< 0
β < 0⇔ 3µ2(−1 + φ) + 2(−1 + σ)σ(−1 + φ) + µ(−2− 4φ+ σ(5 + 7φ)) < 0.
(3.8)
Proof. See Appendix C.2.
18Once again, it should be said that these conditions are exactly the same as if we studied the
Jacobian matrix at partial dispersion.
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Consider the condition equivalent to β < 0. If we let φp be the single zero of the
function β (φ) 19, then we can establish the following proposition:
Proposition 3.18. Partial dispersion is unstable if:
φp < φ < 1,
where:
φp =
(2 + 3µ− 2σ)(µ− σ)
3µ2 + 2(−1 + σ)σ + µ(−4 + 7σ) .
Proof. If β is positive then we have a sufficient condition for the partial dispersion to be
unstable. It can easily be verified that β (φp) = 0. Since the expression for β is clearly
linear in φ and an increasing function of φ, then partial dispersion is unstable for a φ
above a threshold value φp.
The previous proposition gives us a sufficient condition for the instability of partial
dispersion. However, we suspect that this configuration is unstable, for all parameter
values. Numerical inspection of both conditions in (3.8) suggests that these are never
simultaneously met. Figure 3.5 lets us see the whole picture for fixed values of either σ
or µ. We choose, as usual, µ = 0.4, and plot the region of stability of partial dispersion.
The upper region corresponds to β < 0 and the lower region to ξ < 0. That they
are never simultaneously negative is straightforward to see. We can argue that partial
stability will certainly never be a stable outcome if ξ (φp) > 0. However, the difficulty
we faced when comparing full agglomeration and total dispersion is present here too,
because of the non-linearity in φ due to the exponent µ1−σ . But figure 4 seems to suggest
something more. Notice that, for a value of φ very close to zero, the eigenvalue β is only
negative above a threshold value of σ that seems to greater than the “no-black-hole”
condition:
β(φ = 0) = −3µ2 − 2(−1 + σ)σ + µ(−2 + 5σ).
19The function β(φ) is clearly linear in φ.
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Figure 3.5 – The bottom left area in the picture to the left (resp. upper left area in the
picture to the right) is the region whereβ < 0, while the other one corresponds to ξ < 0.
Apparently, the conditions for stability of partial dispersion are never simultaneously met.
The threshold value of σ we are looking for is that for which we have:
−3µ2 − 2(−1 + σ)σ + µ(−2 + 5σ) = 0⇔
σ = 1 + 32µ.
We establish the following proposition:
Proposition 3.19. Partial dispersion is always unstable if 1 + µ < σ ≤ 1 + 32µ.
Proof. If at least one of the eigenvalues is positive for a σ such that 1+µ < σ ≤ 1+ 32µ,
then partial dispersion is unstable. Consider the eigenvalue β. Substitution of the upper
bound σ = 1 + 32µ entails:
β = 6µ(1 + 3µ)φ > 0.
On the other hand, substituting the lower bound σ = 1 + µ renders:
β = µ(1 + (5 + 12µ)φ) > 0.
The second derivative of β with respect to σ gives us:
∂2β
∂σ2
= 4(φ− 1) < 0,
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which proves that β is concave. Since β is a continuous function in σ in all its domain,
the fact that it is positive at both the upper and lower limit imposed on σ in proposition
3.19 necessarily implies that it is positive in between them. Hence, the eigenvalue β
is positive for 1 + µ < σ ≤ 1 + 32µ and thus partial dispersion is unstable in that
interval.
It seems highly plausible that the elasticity of substitution should be above the upper
bound set in proposition 3.19, since that bound is close enough to the “no-black-hole”
condition. So, in order to rule out the possibility of stability of partial dispersion, we
need to consider values of σ above 1 + 32µ. Again, this appears to be very hard or even
impossible to prove analytically. Representing the regions in (3.8) in the parameter
space is a generalization of what we portrayed in figure 4 for every µ. Figure 3.6
contains the regions and shows clearer evidence that an equilibria where skilled workers
are equally dispersed across two of the regions can never be a stable one.
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Figure 3.6 – Depiction of the surfaces ξ = 0 and β = 0 in parameter space (resp. top
and bottom surface). Under the bottom surface we have β < 0 and above the top surface
we have ξ < 0, hence the region between the two surfaces means that ξ and β can never
be simultaneously negative.
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3.5 Bifurcation in the 3-region FE model
One important feature of symmetric 2-region CP models is the existence of a “subcritical
pitchfork” bifurcation20. It is used to explain the change in the spatial distribution of
industry, for a given set of parameters, as the transport costs change. When transport
costs are very high, only a symmetric equilibrium21 is a stable outcome. However,
as soon as the transport costs fall below a threshold level, two other stable equilibria
will arise, those corresponding to concentration outcomes. If transport costs are low
enough, the symmetric equilibrium will become unstable and full agglomeration will be
the only stable outcome.
The results we have obtained so far in this section allow us to conclude that this kind of
bifurcation also exists in the 3-region FE model. Instead of building a three dimensional
bifurcation diagram, we adopt a similar approach to Fujita et al. (1999, chap. 6), where
the dynamics of an extension of the CP model to three regions are portrayed inside the
2-simplex. In the previous sections, we have obtained (hopefully) enough analytical and
numerical results to enable us to reduce the dynamics of the model to three distinct
cases of transport costs.
All settings of parameters used in this subsection are chosen by numerical inspection.
For the three simulations made, we set σ = 5 and µ = 0.4. Figure 3.7 depicts the
dynamics portrayed in (3.1) inside the 2-simplex for three different values of φ. On the
picture to the left we have high transport costs (φ = 0.5) and we can see that total
dispersion is the only stable equilibrium, as the vector field exhibits convergence to
the middle point of the simplex. The picture in the middle corresponds to a moderate
level of transport costs (φ = 0.6), whereby both concentration and total dispersion are
stable equilibria. This means that we have 0.5 < φs < 0.6, because we know that
concentration can only be stable when φ is above the sustain point. One can also
see that the decrease in the transport costs gave rise to three new unstable equilibria
between total dispersion and the concentration configurations. These were not observed
20This is also known as “tomahawk” bifurcation, though the latter designation might be more suitable
to name the corresponding bifurcation diagram, rather than the bifurcation itself.
21This would be equivalent to total dispersion in our model.
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in our analysis as the expressions are too complicated. Finally, when transport costs
are low enough (φ = 0.9), total dispersion is no longer stable and the only possible
outcome is that of full agglomeration of skilled workers in one of the three regions.
Here, we have φb < φ = 0.9. This latter case is shown in the picture to the right, where
we can see convergence to either vertices of the simplex.
Figure 3.7 – The dynamics of the FE 3-region model. The pictures from the left to the
right depict the change in the stability of equilibria as transport costs fall.
Of course, we have φs < φb, as the results obtained in section 3.3 would suggest.
Another important aspect is that, throughout the three cases described in figure 3.7,
partial dispersion is always unstable, which is also not surprising. All these results
corroborate those in Fujita et al (1999, chap. 6).
In a general way, “subcritical pitchfork” bifurcations arise in most CP models where the
regions concerned are fully symmetric. It is widely acknowledged that these bifurcations
disappear when there are exogenous regional differences (e.g. see Baldwin et al., 2003).
In particular, the FE model for two regions is no exception, as is shown by Forslid and
Ottaviano (2003). However, discussions remain on whether the core-periphery pattern
implicit in such bifurcations is a sustainable one, even when the model on which it is
based is symmetric.
In the article concerning bifurcations in migration dynamics by Berliant and Kung
(2009), the authors criticize this view, on the grounds that the existence of bifurcations
in symmetric CP models rest on a strategic parametrization of the model. While many
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authors claim that it is exogenous asymmetries alone that break core-periphery patterns
based on bifurcations, Berliant and Kung argue that, while this might be one of the
reasons, variations in parameters that preserve the symmetry between regions in the
models may also contribute to this. Therefore, bifurcations in CP models suffer from a
lack of robustness.
The parametrization used in this subsection is indeed a strategic choice to facilitate the
explanation of bifurcations in the 3-region FE model. However, given the numerical
evidence presented in section 3.3, it seems plausible that the dynamics implicit in
the model will always undergo a “subcritical pitchfork” bifurcation, as there seems to
be a region in parameter space, for φ ∈ (0, 1), where both concentration and total
dispersion are stable. Nevertheless, we have shown that this region is very thin, and
hardly noticeable when σ and µ are very high. Of course, considering propositions 3.13
and 3.6 yet again, there are no bifurcations when the industrial sector faces perfect
competition or when it is non-existent.
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4 Note on possible extensions of the FE model to
n-regions
All the results we have obtained so far pertain to an analysis concerning an extension
of the FE model by Forslid and Ottaviano (2003) to three regions. Even with an
analytically solvable version of the original CP model by Krugman (1991b), expressions
such as the real wages as explicit functions of the spatial distribution of skilled workers
seem hardly intelligible and most derivations concerning the study of dynamics seem
to imply cumbersome calculations. If nothing else, one could at least imagine that
further augmenting the dimension by increasing the number of regions considered in
the analysis might transform it into an unmanageable problem. In particular, some
issues that are impossible to address analytically in the model with three regions are
likely to remain unaddressable in a model with four or more regions. Nonetheless,
expanding the study of Economic Geography to include more regions should not be
overlooked if the objective is to explain geographical concentration of industry in a
world comprised of many inter-related regions.
Though an extension to the n-region case is not the object of this dissertation, the
analysis of the 3-region model and its comparisons with the 2-region one might give some
insights and serve as a motivation in the sense of extending the assumptions implicit
in the FE model to a broader context. First of all, we have proved that concentration
is more likely in the 3-region model (while total dispersion is less likely) in comparison
with the 2-region model. This could mean that increasing the number of regions in the
analysis would result in increasing the possibility of concentration (and the opposite
respective to total dispersion). Castro et al. (2012), for instance, proved that dispersion
is less likely in a 4-region model compared to the 3-region model (considering Krugman’s
original CP model). Another extrapolation, which may seem very straightforward, is
that of considering the limit cases of µ approaching zero and σ approaching infinity
on a n-region model. It would seem reasonable to claim that, in both these cases,
dispersion is always stable (while concentration never is). Further results would most
likely require a formal application of the FE model to a n-region context. A good
next step would be to consider n regions equally spaced around a circumference, with
equal trade costs between each adjacent region, and build the FE model around these
assumptions. Perhaps the simplifying and uncompromising assumptions implicit in the
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FE model by Forslid and Ottaviano (2003) will allow for a complement on the results of
the Racetrack Economy (Fujita et al., 1999), which provides the aforementioned set-up.
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5 Conclusion
Building on the 2-region FE model by Forslid and Ottaviano (2003), we have obtained
both analytical and numerical results from a FE model with three regions, which we
have constructed along the lines of Forslid and Ottaviano. These results corroborate
those already obtained in previous works on 3-region Core Periphery models. We have
shown that the 3-region FE model favours concentration in comparison with the 2-
region one. Furthermore, we have proved analytically that both concentration and full
dispersion can be simultaneously stable and provided numerical evidence in that, for
every pair (µ, σ), there exists φ ∈ (0, 1) where this is possible, though this outcome is
very unlikely. This means that, like the 2-region model, the 3-region FE model exhibits
a core-periphery pattern based on a “subcritical pitchfork” bifurcation. We have also
concluded numerically that the dispersion of skilled workers among two regions is not
sustainable in a model with three regions, where it corresponds to an outcome of partial
dispersion.
All of these results are tantamount to those in the CP model with three regions in
Castro et al. (2012), the difference being that, additionally, we were able to obtain
explicit solutions for skilled wages and obtain relations between the relevant endogenous
variables and the spatial distribution of skilled workers. Additionally, we proved that,
when the manufacturing sector becomes irrelevant (resp. all local income is spent on
agriculture) or it approaches perfect competition, migration decisions of skilled workers
are the same in both the 2-region and the 3-region FE models. This, as was previously
shown, occurs because there is convergence to zero of the critical values of the transport
costs, where the stability of agglomeration and full dispersion changes. However, if
this happens, concentration can never be a stable outcome, insofar as transport costs
cannot fall below zero, while full dispersion, on the contrary, will always be a stable
equilibrium. This come as no surprise, as a significant weight of the industrial sector
and heterogeneity between the goods produced by it are among some of the factors
essential to sustain a self-reinforced agglomeration process.
Although the FE model is able to give us closed form solutions, the assumptions it
makes still do not allow enough simplification to fully assess analytically the dynamic
properties when its analysis is applied to three regions. Although there is more relevant
evidence in that outcomes such as partial dispersion can never be a stable outcome in a
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Core Periphery model, nonlinearity in transport costs concerning its stability conditions
still makes it impossible to analytically exclude the possibility that skilled workers might
equally disperse across two regions when there are three regions available to migrate.
Whereas the 2-region FE model is useful to address issues beyond the explanation
capability of the original CP model by Krugman (1991b), doubts remain about whether
it is suitable to tackle the more complex case of n regions, though such an analysis
could be interesting, as the higher the number of regions subject to the study of Core-
Periphery models, the better the insight we will get on New Economic Geography.
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Appendix A
In order to study the dynamics of the Core-Periphery model with three regions it is
necessary to find an expression for wi, the reason being that skilled workers migrate
to the region where they have the highest indirect utility, so naturally, a comparison
between real wages is required.
Proof of proposition 2.1:
Proof. We have the following linear system of equations determining the nominal wages,
after (2.13):

w1 =
µ
σ
∑3
j=1
φ1j
(
L
3 + wjHj
)
Rj
w2 =
µ
σ
∑3
j=1
φ2j
(
L
3 + wjHj
)
Rj
w3 =
µ
σ
∑3
j=1
φ3j
(
L
3 + wjHj
)
Rj
,
which becomes, after some manipulation:
w1
(
1− µ
σ
H1
R1
)
− w2
(
µ
σ
φH2
R2
)
− w3
(
µ
σ
φH3
R3
)
= µ
σ
L
3
( 1
R1
+ φ
R2
+ φ
R3
)
w1
(
−µ
σ
φH1
R1
)
+ w2
(
1− µ
σ
H2
R2
)
− w3
(
µ
σ
φH3
R3
)
= µ
σ
L
3
(
φ
R1
+ 1
R2
+ φ
R3
)
w1
(
−µ
σ
φH1
R1
)
− w2
(
µ
σ
φH2
R2
)
+ w3
(
1− µ
σ
φH3
R3
)
= µ
σ
L
3
(
φ
R1
+ φ
R2
+ 1
R3
)
.
This may be written in matrix form as AW = B, where A stands for the coefficients
matrix, W the vector of nominal wages wi, while B is the column vector of independent
terms in the right-hand side of the system of equations above. Applying Cramer’s Rule,
the solution to this system is of the following form:
wi =
Dwi
D
,
where the denominator D stands for the determinant of matrix A and Dwi is the
determinant of the matrix obtained by replacing the i-th column of A by the column
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vector B. This method is useful since we only need to solve for a specific nominal wage,
e.g w1, and easily deduce the remaining solutions applying an argument of symmetry.
Finding an expression for D first, we have:
D =
(
1− µ
σ
H1
R1
)(
1− µ
σ
H2
R2
)(
1− µ
σ
H3
R3
)
+ 2
(
−µ
σ
φ
H2
R2
)(
−µ
σ
φ
H3
R3
)(
−µ
σ
φ
H1
R1
)
−
−
(
1− µ
σ
H1
R1
)(
−φµ
σ
H2
R2
)(
−µ
σ
φ
H3
R3
)
−
(
−µ
σ
φ
H1
R1
)(
1− µ
σ
H2
R2
)(
−µ
σ
φ
H3
R3
)
−
−
(
−µ
σ
φ
H1
R1
)(
−µ
σ
φ
H2
R2
)(
1− µ
σ
H3
R3
)
= 1− µ
σ
(
H1
R1
+ H2
R2
+ H3
R3
)
+ µ
2
σ2
(
1− φ2)(H1H2
R1R2
+ H1H3
R1R3
+ H2H3
R2R3
)
−µ
3
σ3
(
2φ3 − 3φ2 + 1) H1H2H3
R1R2R3
⇔ D = 1− µ
σ
3∑
j=1
Hj
Rj
+ µ
2
σ2
(
1− φ2)(H1H2
R1R2
+ H1H3
R1R3
+ H2H3
R2R3
)
−
−µ
3
σ3
(
2φ3 − 3φ2 + 1) 3∏
j=1
Hj
Rj
, (5.1)
which is obviously invariant under any distribution of skilled workers across the regions,
since it is a common denominator for every solution of the nominal wage wi.
The numerator of w1, Dw1, can be calculated as follows:
Dw1 =
µ
σ
L
3
a
(
1− µ
σ
H2
R2
)(
1− µ
σ
H3
R3
)
+ µ
σ
L
3
c
(
µ
σ
φ
H3
R3
)(
µ
σ
φ
H2
R2
)
+ µ
σ
L
3
b
(
µ
σ
φ
H2
R2
)(
µ
σ
φ
H3
R3
)
−µ
σ
L
3
c
(
1− µ
σ
H2
R2
)(
−µ
σ
φ
H3
R3
)
− µ
σ
L
3
a
(
µ
σ
φ
H2
R2
)(
µ
σ
φ
H3
R3
)
− µ
σ
L
3
b
(
−µ
σ
φ
H2
R2
)(
1− µ
σ
H3
R3
)
= µ
σ
L
3
a
[
1− µ
σ
(
H2
R2
+ H3
R3
)]
+ µ
2
σ2
L
3
φ
(
b
H2
R2
+ cH3
R3
)
+
+
(
a+ cφ2 + bφ2 − cφ− aφ2 − bφ
) µ3
σ3
L
3
H2H3
R2R3
,
⇔ Dw1 = µ
σ
L
3
{
a+ µ
σ
[
H2
R2
(φb− a) + H3
R3
(φc− a)
]
+
(
a+ cφ2 + bφ2 − cφ− aφ2 − bφ
) µ3
σ3
H2H3
R2R3
}
where a =
(
1
R1
+ φ
R2
+ φ
R3
)
,b =
(
φ
R1
+ 1
R2
+ φ
R3
)
and c =
(
φ
R1
+ φ
R2
+ 1
R3
)
. Simplifying
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to eliminate a, b and c, we end up with:
Dw1 =
µ
σ
L
3
{( 1
R1
+ φ
R2
+ φ
R3
)
+ µ
σ
[
φ (φ− 1) H2 +H3
R2R3
+ φ
2 − 1
R1
(
H2
R2
+ H3
R3
)]
+
+µ
2
σ2
(
2φ3 − 3φ2 + 1
) H2H3
R1R2R3
}
⇔ Dw1 = µ
σ
L
3

 3∑
j=1
φ1j
Rj
+ µ
σ
[
φ (φ− 1) H2 +H3
R2R3
+ φ
2 − 1
R1
(
H2
R2
+ H3
R3
)]
+
+µ
2
σ2
(
2φ3 − 3φ2 + 1
) H2H3
R1R2R3
}
(5.2)
The expression for the nominal wage in region 1 is obtained dividing equation (5.2) by
equation (5.1):
w1 =
µ
σ
L
3
{∑3
j=1
φ1j
Rj
+ µ
σ
[
φ (φ− 1) H2 +H3
R2R3
+ φ
2 − 1
R1
(
H2
R2
+ H3
R3
)]
+ µ
2
σ2
(
2φ3 − 3φ2 + 1
) H2H3
R1R2R3
}
1− µ
σ
∑3
j=1
Hj
Rj
+ µ
2
σ2
(1− φ2)
(
H1H2
R1R2
+ H1H3
R1R3
+ H2H3
R2R3
)
− µ
3
σ3
(2φ3 − 3φ2 + 1)
∏3
j=1
Hj
Rj
.
One can see that, under a given distribution of H, w1(H1, H2, H3) = w1(H1, H3, H2),
which is a consequence of the existing symmetry in region 2 and region 3, since there is
nothing to distinguish between the two regions. An analogous argument can be made
concerning region 1 and any of the other two regions. This means that the nominal wage
in region i is invariant in the distribution of skilled workers in the other two regions.
Symmetry among the regions also asserts that w1 (H1, H2, H3) = w2 (H2, H1, H3) =
w3 (H3, H1, H2). Thus, we can formulate a general expression for the numerator of the
nominal wage, Dwi:
Dwi =
µ
σ
L
3

3∑
j=1
φij
Rj
+ µ
σ
φ (φ− 1) ∑k 6=iHk∏
k 6=iRk
+ φ
2 − 1
Ri
∑
k 6=i
Hk
Rk
+
+µ
2
σ2
(
2φ3 − 3φ2 + 1
) 1
Ri
∏
k 6=i
Hk
Rk
 , i = {1, 2, 3}.
It follows that the nominal wage wi is the quotient between the latter equation and the
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determinant D in (5.1):
wi =
µ
σ
L
3

3∑
j=1
φ1j
Rj
+ µ
σ
φ (φ− 1)
∑
k 6=i
Hk∏
k 6=i
Rk
+ φ
2 − 1
Ri
∑
k 6=i
Hk
Rk
+ µ2σ2 (2φ3 − 3φ2 + 1) 1Ri∏
k 6=i
Hk
Rk

1− µ
σ
3∑
j=1
Hj
Rj
+ µ
2
σ2
(1− φ2)
(
H1H2
R1R2
+ H1H3
R1R3
+ H2H3
R2R3
)
− µ
3
σ3
(2φ3 − 3φ2 + 1)
3∏
j=1
Hj
Rj
.
Appendix B
Proof of proposition 3.9:
Proof. We have at most three different types of configurations (h1, h2, 1− h1 − h2) when
hi =
1− hj
2 and 0 < hi < 1.
First, if 0 < h1 =
1− h2
2 < 1, we have:(
1− h2
2 , h2,
1− h2
2
)
= (a, b, a).
Second, we have 0 < h2 =
1− h2
2 < 1:(
h1,
1− h2
2 ,
1− h2
2
)
= (b, a, a).
Finally, if h2 = h1, we end up with:(
1− h2
2 ,
1− h2
2 ,
1− h2
2
)
= (a, a, a).
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Consider the first case, where h1 = a =
1− h2
2 . It follows that
ω¯(h1, h2, 1− h1 − h2) = ω¯(a, b, a).
If ∂ω¯
∂h1
> 0, then:
∃ε > 0 : ω¯(a+ ε, b, a− ε) > ω¯(a, b, a) 1.
However, symmetry among regions means the average real wage is invariant after coor-
dinate permutation, implying:
ω¯(a+ ε, b, a− ε) = ω¯(a− ε, b, a+ ε),
and hence:
ω¯(a− ε, b, a+ ε) > ω¯(a, b, a),
contradicting ∂ω¯
∂h1
> 0. By analogy, it is also false that ∂ω¯
∂h1
< 0. Therefore, ∂ω¯
∂h1
= 0. An
analogous reasoning yields ∂ω¯
∂h2
= 0.
Appendix C
This Appendix includes the calculations of the partial derivatives and their value at the
relevant configurations required to find the conditions for stability of total dispersion
and partial dispersion, respectively. It is composed of some very tedious algebra, so
uninterested readers can skip right to part C.1 or C.2 of the Appendix unconcernedly.
To find all necessary derivatives, it is best to do this in a stepwise fashion, applying
1Recall that h3 is a function of h1 and h2. Since we are working in two coordinates and h3 is
implicitly defined, the concept of partial derivative means that h2 should remain constant when we
vary h1. Every variation in h1 must therefore be reflected in h3 and we write it explicitly so that the
notion and consequences of symmetry are made clearer.
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quotient rules successively. Let us begin by differentiating ωi with respect to hi:
∂ωi
∂hi
=
∂wi
∂hi
P µ1 −
∂P µi
∂hi
w1
P 2µi
,
and in its turn:
∂wi
∂hi
=
∂Dwi
∂hi
D − ∂D
∂hi
Dwi
D2
.
This is easier if we do this from the perspective of a specific region, say region 1
and differentiate with respect to h1 and h2. We can then generalize for any region
i, considering symmetry between regions. Starting with ∂w1
∂h1
, picking first Dw1 from
(2.16):
∂Dw1
∂h1
= 1
H
µ
σ
L
3
{
φ− 1
r12
+ (1− φ)φ
r32
+ µ
σ
(φ− 1)
[
− (φ− 1)φ (1− h1)
r2r23
− φ
r2r3
+ (φ+ 1)
(
− (−1 + φ)h3
r1r23
− 1
r1r3
)
−
−(1− φ) (φ+ 1)
(
h2
r2r21
+ h3
r3r21
)]
+ µ
2
σ2
(
1− 3φ2 + 2φ3
) h2
r2
(
(φ− 1)h3
r1r23
− 1
r1r3
+ (φ− 1)h3
r21r3
)}
⇔
∂Dw1
∂h1
= 1
H
µ
σ
L
3
{
φ− 1
r12
+ (1− φ)φ
r32
+ µ
σ
[
− (φ− 1)φ (1− h1)
r2r23
− φ
r2r3
− φ (φ+ 1)
r1r23
+
(
φ2 − 1
) 1
r21
(
h2
r2
+ h3
r3
)]
+
+µ
2
σ2
(
1− 3φ2 + 2φ3
) h2
r2
(
(φ− 1)h3
r21r3
− φ
r1r23
)}
Further simplification renders:
∂Dw1
∂h1
= 1
H
µ
σ
L
3
(φ− 1)
{
1
r12
− φ
r32
+ µ
σ
[
−φ
(
φ− h2 + φh2
r2r23
+ φ+ 1
r1r23
)
+
(
φ2 − 1
) 1
r21
(
h2
r2
+ h3
r3
)]
+
+µ
2
σ2
(
2φ2 − φ− 1
) h2
r2
(
(φ− 1)h3
r21r3
− φ
r1r23
)}
.
Symmetry between regions, whereby w1 (h1, h2) = w2 (h2, h1) implies ∂Dw2∂h2 (h2, h1) =
∂Dw1
∂h1
(h1, h2). Thus, the following is true:
∂Dwi
∂hi
= 1
H
µ
σ
L
3
(φ− 1)
{
1
ri2
− φ
r32
+ µ
σ
[
−φ
(
φ− hj + φhj
rjr2k
+ φ+ 1
rir2k
)
+
(
φ2 − 1
) 1
r2i
(
hj
rj
+ hk
rk
)]
+
+µ
2
σ2
(
2φ2 − φ− 1
) hj
rj
(
(φ− 1)hk
r2i rk
− φ
rir2k
)}
, i, j, k = (1, 2, 3) ,
where
rk = 1 + (φ− 1) (hi + hj) and hk = 1− hi − hj.
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Moving on to ∂D
∂h1
, through (2.17) we have:
∂D
∂h1
= −µ
σ
φ
(
1
r21
− 1
r23
)
+ µ
2
σ2
(
1− φ2) [− (1− φ)h1h2
r21r2
+ h2
r1r2
− (−1 + φ)h1h3
r1r23
− (−1 + φ)h3h2
r2r23
− h1
r1r2
− (1− φ)h1h3
r1r23
+ h3
r1r3
− h2
r2r3
]
− µ
3
σ3
(
2φ3 − 3φ2 + 1)×
×h2
r2
[
− (−1 + φ)h1h3h2
r1r2r23
− h1h2
r1r2r3
− (1− φ)h1h3h2
r21r2r3
+ h3h2
r1r2r3
]
,
which becomes, after more manipulation:
∂D
∂h1
= −µ
σ
φ
(
1
r21
− 1
r23
)
+ µ
2
σ2
(
1− φ2
)[
φ
(−1 + 2h1 + h2) (−φ+ 2(−1 + φ)h2 (1 + (−1 + φ)h2))
r21r2r
2
3
]
+µ
3
σ3
(
2φ3 − 3φ2 + 1
) h2
r2
[
φ
h2 (−1 + 2h1 + h2) (1 + (−1 + φ)h2)
r21r2r
2
3
]
⇔
∂D
∂h1
= µ
σ
φ
{
− 1
r21
+ 1
r23
+ µ
σ
(φ− 1) 2h1 + h2 − 1
r21r2r
2
3
[
− (φ+ 1) (−φ+ 2(−1 + φ)h2 (1 + (−1 + φ)h2)) +
+µ
2
σ2
(
2φ2 − φ− 1
) h22
r2
(1 + (−1 + φ)h2)
]}
.
Furthermore, because of symmetry between regions, the derivatives of D with respect
to hi can be expressed in the following fashion:
∂D
∂hi
= µ
σ
φ
{
− 1
r2i
+ 1
r2
k
+ µ
σ
(φ− 1)φ2hi + hj − 1
r2i rjr
2
k
[
(1− φ) (−φ+ 2(−1 + φ)hi (1 + (−1 + φ)hi)) +
+µ
2
σ2
(
2φ2 − φ− 1
) h2j
rj
(1 + (−1 + φ)hj)
]}
, i, j, k = (1, 2, 3) . (5.3)
As for ∂Dw1
∂h2
, it goes:
∂Dw1
∂h2
= µ
σ
L
3
1
H
(
φ (φ− 1)
r22
+ φ (1− φ)
r23
)
+ µ
2
σ2
L
3
1
H
(φ− 1)
[
− (−1 + φ)φ (1− h1)
r2r23
−
− (1− φ)φ (1− h1)
r22r3
+ (1 + φ)
(
− (1− φ)h2
r1r22
+ 1
r1r2
− (φ− 1)h3
r1r23
− 1
r1r3
)]
+
+µ
2
σ2
(
2φ3 − 3φ2 + 1
) 1
r1
[
− (−1 + φ)h2h3
r2r23
− (1− φ)h2h3
r22r3
+ h3
r2r3
− h2
r2r3
]
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∂Dw1
∂h2
= µ
σ
L
3
1
H
(
φ (φ− 1)
r22
+ φ (1− φ)
r23
)
+ µ
2
σ2
L
3
1
H
(φ− 1)×
×
(φ− 1)φ
(
1 + φ+ 2φ2 −
(
2− 3φ+ φ2
)
h1 + (−1 + φ)2h21
)
(−1 + h1 + 2h2)
r1r22r
2
3
+
+µ
2
σ2
(
2φ3 − 3φ2 + 1
) 1
r1
[
−φ (1 + (−1 + φ)h1) (−1 + h1 + 2h2)
r22r
2
3
]
⇔
⇔ ∂Dw1
∂h2
= µ
σ
L
3
1
H
φ (φ− 1)
{
1
r22
− 1
r23
+ µ
σ
h1 + 2h2 − 1
r1r22r
2
3
(φ− 1)×
×
[(
1 + φ+ 2φ2 −
(
2− 3φ+ φ2
)
h1 + (−1 + φ)2h21
)
−
−µ
2
σ2
(2φ+ 1) (1 + (−1 + φ)h1)
]}
.
Once again, symmetry between regions imposes ∂Dw1
∂h2
(h1, h2) =
∂Dw2
∂h1
(h2, h1), so
generalization for any region i implies:
∂Dwi
∂hj
= µ
σ
L
3
1
H
φ (φ− 1)
{
1
r2j
− 1
r2k
+ µ
σ
hi + 2hj − 1
rir2j r
2
k
(φ− 1)
[ (
1 + φ+ 2φ2−
− (2− 3φ+ φ2)hi + (−1 + φ)2h2i )− µ2σ2 (2φ+ 1) (1 + (−1 + φ)hi)
]}
.
Having found the expressions for all derivatives that compose ∂wi
∂hi
, we now have only
to find a general expression for the derivatives of P µi , so we can use it to obtain the
values of ∂ωi
∂hi
in the different configurations. This can be done effortlessly for any region
i, differentiating P µi with respect to hi considering Pi in equation (2.18):
∂P µi
∂hi
= µ1− φ1− σ
β σ
σ − 1
(
H
α
) 11−σ
µ
r
1
1−σ−1
i .
C.1 Total Dispersion
Proof of Proposition 3.12:
Proof. The configuration (H1, H2, H3) =
(
H
3 ,
H
3 ,
H
3
)
is equivalent to (h1, h2) =
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
.
At this point, we denote:
r1, r2, r3 = 2φ+13 = r.
for simplification purposes.
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Total dispersion is stable as long as:
∂ω1
∂h1
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
< 0⇔
∂w1
∂h1
P µ1 −
∂P µ1
∂h1
w1 < 0,
since the price index has to be positive
(
P 2µ1 > 0
)
.
Substitution of
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
in (5.3) yields ∂D
∂hi
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
= 0, since:
2hi + hj − 1 = 23 +
1
3 − 1 = 0 and −
1
r21
+ 1
r22
= − 1
r2
+ 1
r2
= 0.
This enables us to write ∂w1
∂h1
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
as follows:
∂w1
∂h1
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
= ∂Dw1
∂h1
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
D−1
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
.
However, remark that:
∂w1
∂h1
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
Pµ1
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
− ∂P
µ
1
∂h1
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
w1
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
< 0⇔
⇔ ∂P
µ
1
∂h1
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
P−µ1
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
>
∂w1
∂h1
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
w−11
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
⇔
⇔ ∂P
µ
1
∂h1
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
P−µ1
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
>
∂Dw1
∂h1
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
D−1
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
D
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
Dw−11
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
⇔
⇔ ∂Dw1
∂h1
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
Dw−11
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
<
∂Pµ1
∂h1
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
P−µ1
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
. (5.4)
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where:
∂Dw1
∂h1
( 1
3 ,
1
3
)
= 1
H
µ
σ
L
3 (φ− 1)
{
1− φ
r2
+ µ
σ
1
r3
[
−φ
(
φ− 13 + φ
1
3 + φ+ 1
)
+ 23
(
φ2 − 1)]+
+µ
2
σ2
(
2φ2 − φ− 1) 13 1r4
(
1
3 (φ− 1)− φ
)}
⇔
⇔ ∂Dw1
∂h1
( 1
3 ,
1
3
)
= 1
H
µ
σ
L
3 (φ− 1)
{
1− φ
r2
− 13
µ
σ
1
r3
[(
2 + 2φ+ 5φ2
)]
+
−µ
2
σ2
(φ− 1) (2φ+ 1)3
1
r4
(2φ+ 1)
3
}
= 1
H
µ
σ
L
3 (φ− 1)
{
1− φ
r2
− 13
µ
σ
1
r3
(
2 + 2φ+ 5φ2
)
+ µ
2
σ2
(1− φ) 1
r2
}
⇔ ∂Dw1
∂h1
( 1
3 ,
1
3
)
= 1
H
µ
σ
L
3 (φ− 1)
1
r2
{
(1− φ)
(
1 + µ
2
σ2
)
− 13
µ
σ
1
r
(
2 + 2φ+ 5φ2
)}
.
As for Dw1
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
, we have:
Dw1
( 1
3 ,
1
3
)
= µ
σ
L
3
1
H
{
2φ+ 1
r
+ µ
σ
2
3(φ− 1)(2φ+ 1)
1
r2
+ µ
2
σ2
(2φ+ 1) (φ− 1)2 19
1
r3
}
= µ
σ
L
3
1
H
(2φ+ 1)
{
1
r
+ µ
σ
2
3(φ− 1)
1
r2
+ µ
2
σ2
(φ− 1)2 19r3
}
⇔
= µ
σ
L
3
1
H
{
3 + µ
σ
2(φ− 1)1
r
+ µ
2
σ2
(φ− 1)2 13r2
}
⇔
⇔ Dw1
( 1
3 ,
1
3
)
= µ
σ
L
3
1
H
{
3 + φ− 1
r
[
2µ
σ
+ µ
2
σ2
(φ− 1)
3r
]}
.
Moreover, notice that:
∂P µ1
∂h1
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
P−µ1
(
1
3 ,
1
3
)
= µ
r
1− φ
1− σ .
We can now finally compute the expression for stability of total dispersion implicit in
(5.4):
1
H
µ
σ
L
3 (φ− 1)
1
r2
{
(1− φ)
(
1 + µ
2
σ2
)
− 13
µ
σ
1
r
(
2 + 2φ+ 5φ2
)}
<
<
µ
r
1− φ
1− σ
µ
σ
L
3
1
H
{
3 + φ− 1
r
[
2µ
σ
+ µ
2
σ2
(φ− 1)
3r
]}
⇔
⇔ φ− 1
r
{
(1− φ)
(
1 + µ
2
σ2
)
− 13
µ
σ
1
r
(
2 + 2φ+ 5φ2
)}
<
< −µφ− 1
σ − 1
{
3 + (φ− 1)
r
[
2µ
σ
+ µ
2
σ2
(φ− 1)
3r
]}
,
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thus yielding:
(φ− 1)
{
1
2φ+ 1
[
(1− φ)
(
1 + µ
2
σ2
)
− µ
σ
2 + 2φ+ 5φ2
2φ+ 1
]
+ µ
1− σ
[
1 + φ− 1
2φ+ 1
(
2µ
σ
+ µ
2
σ2
φ− 1
2φ+ 1
)]}
< 0.
Rewriting the inequality after placing the expression on the left-hand side under the
common denominator (−1 + σ)(σ + 2σφ)2 entails:
(1− φ)(σ + µ(−1 + φ) + 2σφ) (µ2(−1 + φ) + (−1 + σ)σ(−1 + φ) + µ(−1 + 2σ)(1 + 2φ))
(−1 + σ)(σ + 2σφ)2 < 0⇔
(1− φ) (µ2(−1 + φ) + (−1 + σ)σ(−1 + φ) + µ(−1 + 2σ)(1 + 2φ)) < 0⇔
µ2(φ− 1) + (σ − 1)σ(φ− 1) + µ(−1 + 2σ)(1 + 2φ) < 0.
C.2 Partial Dispersion
Proof of Proposition 3.17:
Proof. As our model is specified, the configuration (H1, H2, H3) =
(
0, H2 ,
H
2
)
is the same
as (h1, h2) =
(
0, 12
)
. This means region 1 is the chosen to be left out of skilled workers,
so the endowment H is equally distributed across regions 2 and 3. First of all, note the
implications this has on ri. We have:
r1 = φ and r2, r3 =
1 + φ
2 .
Stability of this equilibrium requires ξ and β in to be negative. It has been shown in
Section 3.3 that the stability conditions pertain to:
∂ω2
∂h2
(
0, 12
)
< 0,
corresponding to β < 0, and:
ω1
(
0, 12
)
< ω2
(
0, 12
)
,
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which refers to ξ < 0.
The first condition states that:
∂w2
∂h2
(
0, 12
)
P µ2
(
0, 12
)
− ∂P
µ
2
∂h2
(
0, 12
)
w2
(
0, 12
)
< 0,
since price indexes have to be positive. Recalling ∂wi
∂hi
, it follows:
∂w2
∂h2
(
0, 12
)
=
∂Dw2
∂h2
(
0, 12
)
D
(
0, 12
)
− ∂D
∂h2
(
0, 12
)
Dw2
(
0, 12
)
D2
(
0, 12
) .
After substitution of
(
0, 12
)
in ∂D
∂h2
(
0, 12
)
, rendering it equal to zero, we have:
∂w2
∂h2
(
0, 12
)
= ∂Dw2
∂h2
(
0, 12
)
D−1
(
0, 12
)
.
Hence, we are able to rewrite the condition for stability of partial dispersion in the same
fashion as we did for total dispersion:
∂Dw2
∂h2
(
0, 12
)
Dw−12
(
0, 12
)
<
∂P µ2
∂h2
(
0, 12
)
P−µ2
(
0, 12
)
.
First, we have:
∂Dw2
∂h2
(
0, 12
)
= 1
H
µ
σ
L
3 (φ− 1)
{1− φ
r2
+ µ
σ
[
− φ
r2
− 2 φ
r2
+ φ− 1
r2
]}
=
= 1
H
µ
σ
L
3 (φ− 1)
{
4 1− φ(1 + φ)2 −
µ
σ
[
4 2φ+ 2(1 + φ)2
]}
⇔
⇔ ∂Dw2
∂h2
(
0, 12
)
= 1
H
µ
σ
L
3
1
r2
(φ− 1)
[
(1− φ)− µ
σ
(2φ+ 2)
]
.
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As for Dw2, it goes:
Dw2
(
0, 12
)
= µ
σ
L
3
1
H
{
1 + 1 + φ
r
+ µ
σ
[
1
2 (φ− 1)
1
r
+ 12
φ2 − 1
r2
]}
= µ
σ
L
3
1
H
{
3 + 12
µ
σ
[
(φ− 1) 1
r
+ (φ− 1)(φ+ 1)
r2
]}
= µ
σ
L
3
1
H
{
3 + µ
σ
3φ− 1
φ+ 1
}
⇔
⇔ Dw2
(
0, 12
)
= µ
σ
L
H
[
1 + µ
σ
φ− 1
φ+ 1
]
.
Lastly, it is straightforward to see that:
∂P µ2
∂h2
(
0, 12
)
P−µ2
(
0, 12
)
= µ
r
1− φ
1− σ .
Thus we can finally determine the condition β < 0:
β < 0⇔
1
H
µ
σ
L
3
1
r2
(φ− 1)
[
(1− φ)− µ
σ
(2φ+ 2)
]
<
µ
r
1− φ
1− σ
µ
σ
L
H
[
1 + µ
σ
φ− 1
φ+ 1
]
⇔
4 φ− 1(φ+ 1)2
[
(1− φ)− µ
σ
(2φ+ 2)
]
<
µ
1 + φ
1− φ
1− σ
[
1 + µ
σ
φ− 1
φ+ 1
]
.
Placing everything under a common denominator yields, after some manipulation:
−2Lµ(−1 + φ)
(
3µ2(−1 + φ) + 2(−1 + σ)σ(−1 + φ) + µ(−2− 4φ+ σ(5 + 7φ)))
3H(−1 + σ)σ2(1 + φ)2 < 0.
The denominator is positive and so is −2Lµ(−1 + φ). Hence, we end up with:
β = 3µ2(−1 + φ) + 2(−1 + σ)σ(−1 + φ) + µ(−2− 4φ+ σ(5 + 7φ)) < 0.
The second condition for stability of partial dispersions (ξ < 0) implies:
w1
w2
(
0, 12
)
<
P µ1
P µ2
(
0, 12
)
⇔
w1
w2
(
0, 12
)
<
(
φ
r
) µ
1−σ
.
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where:
w1
w2
= Dw1Dw−12 DD−1 ⇔
w1
w2
= Dw1
Dw2
.
Beginning with region 1 we have:
Dw1
(
0, 12
)
= µ
σ
L
3
1
H
{
1
φ
+ 2φ
r
+ µ
σ
[
φ (φ− 1) 1
r2
+ φ
2 − 1
φr
]
+ µ
2
σ2
(
2φ3 − 3φ2 + 1) 1
φ
1
4
1
r2
}
.
More tedious algebra renders:
Dw1
(
0, 12
)
= Lµ(−µ+ σ + (µ+ σ)φ)(σ + µ(−1 + φ)(1 + 2φ) + σφ(1 + 4φ))3Hσ3φ(1 + φ)2 .
We should rewrite Dw2:
Dw2
(
0, 12
)
= 1 + µ
σ
φ− 1
φ+ 1 ⇔
Dw2
(
0, 12
)
= Lµ(−µ+ σ + (µ+ σ)φ)
Hσ2(1 + φ) .
It is now easier to obtain the quotient Dw1
Dw2
:
Dw1
Dw2
(
0, 12
)
= Lµ(−µ+ σ + (µ+ σ)φ)(σ + µ(−1 + φ)(1 + 2φ) + σφ(1 + 4φ))Hσ
2(1 + φ)
3Hσ3φ(1 + φ)2Lµ(−µ+ σ + (µ+ σ)φ) ⇔
Dw1
Dw2
(
0, 12
)
= σ + µ(−1 + φ)(1 + 2φ) + σφ(1 + 4φ)3σφ(1 + φ) .
Finally, the condition ξ < 0 becomes:
σ + µ(−1 + φ)(1 + 2φ) + σφ(1 + 4φ)
3σφ(1 + φ) <
(
2φ
1 + φ
) µ
1−σ ⇔
σφ(1 + φ)
{
σ + µ(−1 + φ)(1 + 2φ) + σφ
[
1 + 4φ− 3
(
2φ
1 + φ
)
(1 + φ)
]}
< 0 ⇔
σ + µ(−1 + φ)(1 + 2φ) + σφ
[
1 + 4φ− 3
(
2φ
1 + φ
) µ
1−σ
(1 + φ)
]
< 0.
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Hence, the partial dispersion equilibrium is stable if and only if:

ξ < 0 ≡ σ + µ(−1 + φ)(1 + 2φ) + σφ
[
1 + 4φ− 3
(
2 φ1+φ
) µ
1−σ (1 + φ)
]
< 0.
β < 0 ≡ 3µ2(−1 + φ) + 2(−1 + σ)σ(−1 + φ) + µ(−2− 4φ+ σ(5 + 7φ)) < 0.
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